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| **AFRICAN INSTUTUTE FOR PROJECT MANAGEMENT STUDIES**  **(AIPMS)-NIROBI-KENYA.**  **COURSE STUDY: FORCED MIGRATION STUDY**  **POST GRADUATE DIPLOMA**  **YEAR 2019.**  **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**  **COURSE UNIT THREE [3]:**  **CAUSES OF MIGRATORY AND REFUGEE MOVEMENTS**  **ATTEMPT QUESTION ASSIGNMENTS FROM ONE-SEVEN [1-7]:**  **SUBMITTED BY:**  **OKETA DOMINIC LABOKE**  **ADMISSION NO: 256/003/2019**  **SUBMITTED TO:**  **MODERATOR: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_\_ 2019.**  **SUBMISSION DATE: 03/07/2019; SIGNATURE:** |

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| **QUESTION ONE [1]**  **Explain briefly international migration as well as forced migration?**  Since the early 1990s several attempts have been made to develop European Union [EU] policies to address the causes of displacement and migration. All, however, have met with qualified success: the development of a coherent strategy has been hindered by the lack of structures for coordinating External Relations and Justice and Home Affairs [JHA], insufficient analytical capacity, and lack of engagement by external policy actors. Nonetheless, recent developments suggest that there is more political will than ever to develop such preventive approaches. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, established an institutional structure that greatly facilitated coordination between JHA and External Relations. December 1998 saw the establishment of a High Level Working Group on Immigration and Asylum, tasked with preparing action plans which would include measures to address the root causes of migration and refugee flows in countries of origin.  Finally, and most significantly, at the special JHA Council in Tampere, October 1999, European leaders agreed that JHA concerns should be integrated into all areas of EU policy. These steps all implied a greater commitment to targeting external policies to the goal of preventing the causes of migration and displacement. The notion of developing such migration prevention strategies has not been without its critics, especially amongst those working on refugee issues. Criticisms have focused in particular on EU attempts to cooperate with third countries to reinforce border controls, implement readmission agreements or combat trafficking and illegal migration. It is often argued that such approaches represent an attempt to contain displacement within countries or regions of origin, often to the detriment of refugee protection [See, Scholdan 2000]. Valid as this critique may be, an important element of the EU approach is targeted towards the rather different goal of mitigating the causes of forced displacement and migration pressures. This need not imply containment, but instead a policy of improving conditions in countries of origin, such that people are not compelled to move. It is on this latter set of strategies policies for preventing the causes of migration and refugee flows that the paper will focus. In fact, despite the increased political will to develop such preventive approaches, there remain a number of institutional and political constraints. Four main problems appear to be impeding efforts to integrate migration and refugee prevention goals into external policy:   * Persisting doubts about whether and under what circumstances prevention can be effective; * Limited in-house capacity and resources for analyzing the causes of migration and refugee flows and appropriate policy responses; * Concerns that migration prevention may conflict with or divert resources from existing external relations and development goals; * Concerns about how to present such a preventive policy to partner countries who may be sensitive about making this an explicit goal of cooperation.   The first three of these obstacles are at least partly a function of the lack of research and rigorous analysis on causes and possible responses to migration and displacement pressures. To be sure, there has been extensive research on the dynamics between development and migration, as well as a number of studies on the causes of forced displacement. [De Jong (1996), 159].  The first is a failure to offer a systematic categorization of the causes and dynamics of migration and refugee flows, or the temporal sequence linking these different factors. Such a typology will be indispensable as a basis for defining the nature, sequencing and possible impact of policy responses. Secondly, most studies fail to link accounts of causes to different levels and types of EU policy response. Where they do discuss policy responses, most simply give a list of possible instruments, assuming they will all have a generally benign impact.  This overlooks the question of the EU's comparative advantages in specific areas of external policy. It also assumes that migration preventive policies are compatible with existing external relations goals and priorities. Yet one of the main obstacles to developing a coherent strategy on prevention is precisely the concern by those engaged in development and external relations that the two may not be consistent. What follows is a first attempt to set out some of the elements for an EU policy framework. The paper will start by looking at the causes and dynamics of migration and forced displacement, and categorizing them according to types of cause, and phases of refugee producing situations and migration cycles. The second part will outline possible responses and consider the circumstances under which these tools could exert a preventive effect. It will look at some of the potential conflicts between migration prevention goals and other external relations objectives. The third section will consider how this as yet skeletal framework could be supplemented by further research. A short word on definitions: of course, the usual caveats about the categories of "refugees", "forced displacement" and "voluntary economic migration" apply. In reality, people's motives for migrating often comprise a complex mixture of political, environment and economic factors. Nonetheless, the distinction between forced displacement and voluntary migration is useful for policy purposes, as measures to address the economic and political causes of migration and flight will tend to differ.  There has been no systematic effort to record or analyses these phenomena. This is an outcome, in part, of the problem of comparative work across a vast range of traditions some of which have no written record. It is also associated, however, with a problem that has long afflicted modern scholarship the dominance of national frames of reference and a general reluctance to consider the circumstances of outsiders and others. Wimmer and Glick Schiller [2000] identify the constraining influence of “methodological nationalism” on modern social thought. This presents peoples and nations or nation-states as synonymous; society in general is sedentary and those who cross borders [territorial and cultural] are anomalous or even dysfunctional. Here historians have played a key role, celebrating nation states and those within their borders. They have seldom recognized cross-border movements or the complex socio-cultural relations and institutional forms with which they have been associated. Amin [quoted in Pandey, 2001: 4] notes the pressure on modern historians to produce records of the “uncluttered national past”. Migrants seldom appear, unless in specific capacities defined by national agendas. People engaged in sudden or unexpected migratory movements have in general been excluded and, notwithstanding their ancient lineage, traditions of protection have been ignored.  The focus upon nation-states and relations within and among them also accounts in part for the very widespread view that refugees did not appear as a meaningful category of persons until the mid-20th century. Then, certain states agreed on formulae which for the first time identified specific migrants as people who might enter systems of state law with the aim of securing protection. The Geneva Convention inserted “the refugee” into international law in the context of asylum guaranteed by national governments. It placed forced migrants formally on the state agenda; at the same time, it excluded most of those seeking protection, including all those the mass of the world’s displaced people located outside Europe. It also placed an unprecedented historic barrier upon access to protection those eligible for asylum must have been affected by events before 1 January 1951. In effect, refugees had been brought into being in a specific time and place: the state system had identified them and only them as authentic candidates for protection.  Before setting out a model of migration, it is useful to briefly distinguish between the sorts of explanations most often invoked. Scholars divide theories of international migration into three main types, which are not mutually exclusive. Macro theories emphasize the structural, objective conditions which act as "push" and "pull" factors for migration.  In the case of economic migration, push factors would typically include economic conditions such as unemployment, low salaries or low per capita income relative to the country of destination. Pull factors would include migration legislation and the labour market situation in receiving countries. Involuntary displacement would be explained through factors such as state repression or fear of generalized violence or civil war.  Most theorists agree that macro conditions such as these are crucial for explaining forced displacement and also so-called "pioneer" voluntary migration i.e. the first individuals or groups of migrants from a given country or area. However, they are less well equipped in accounting for the persistence of voluntary migration despite changes in economic conditions or legislation in receiving countries. Nor can they explain why so much migration occurs from relatively few places: similar push factors exist in many potential sending areas, but while in some cases they generate mass emigration, in others there is almost no mobility [Faist 2001]  Meso theories can help explain these discrepancies. They reject the macro focus on push and pull factors, instead locating migration flows within a complex system of linkages between states, [Bilsborrow and Zlotnik [1994, [5].  Two concepts are particularly important for meso theories: systems and networks. Migration is assumed to occur within a migration system, i.e. a group of countries linked by economic, political and cultural ties as well as migration flows.  The resources that flow through networks make moving a more attractive and feasible option for other members of a network, and can generate what has been termed "chain migration": the phenomenon of serial, large-scale migration from one particular area to another defined area. This meso level is less relevant for explaining forced displacement, although it can help explain the choice of destination for refugees’ systems and networks may make particular places easier to reach or obtain protection in, or more attractive as destinations.  Micro theories focus on the factors influencing individual decisions to migrate, analyzing how potential migrants weigh up the various costs and benefits of migrating. Costs could include the financial and psychological resources invested in moving and integrating in the country of destination, while benefits could include a higher salary or physical safety.  Micro theories often draw on rational choice theory, which makes a number of controversial assumptions about how and why individuals take decisions. However, the micro perspective is an important level of analysis in terms of showing how individuals internally process and assess the various conditions generating migration. It therefore provides a form of check or control for macro and meso theories, describing how individuals actually make decisions on the basis of objective or relational factors. Summarizing the relative strengths of these three approaches, one could conclude that macro theories offer most insight into the factors initially triggering "pioneer" voluntary migration, and also provide the best explanation for forced displacement. Meso theories are best at explaining the persistence of voluntary migration, and why it occurs from some areas and not others. They can also help explain the choice of destination for both voluntary migration and forced displacement. Finally, micro theories can help show how this macro and meso factors are translated into individual decisions to move.  This typology of theories provides a useful background for explaining international migration, and is a good starting point for constructing a general theory of the causes of migration. However, the task here is to examine policy responses that can help mitigate these causes. This will require a rather different sort of typology, based on the possible different levels of intervention. Here it is useful to distinguish between four different types of causal factors: root causes, proximate causes, enabling conditions, and sustaining factors. However, these are borrowed from theories of conflict prevention. Like theories of migration, conflict theories can also be divided into structural, macro theories and agent-based, micro theories.  However, academics and practitioners engaged in conflict prevention have found it useful to categorize the causes of conflict according to the possible levels of intervention or policy tools to prevent conflict. The categories usually include background or root causes, which can be addressed by "structural" or "heavy" intervention; and proximate or triggering factors, which can be prevented through "operational” or "light” intervention. Both types of category are relevant for our framework. See, for example, Lund and Mehler [1999].  The Root causes refer to the underlying structural or systemic conditions which provide the pre-conditions for migration or forced displacement. In terms of the theories discussed above, they combine a combination of macro and meso factors, such as economic underdevelopment, a weak state, severe social fragmentation, as well as migration systems shaping interactions between sending and receiving countries. Proximate causes refer to the immediate conditions that trigger movement, which again can be macro or meso: the escalation of violent conflict, individual persecution, and the collapse of local livelihoods or a new opportunity abroad. Enabling conditions render the actual journey, entry and stay in countries of destination possible. They will include factors such as resources, legislation and border controls, travel possibilities, and networks. Finally, sustaining factors encourage persistent or chain migration from particular places or countries of origin. These are almost exclusively a function of migration networks. All four categories of causes, as we shall see, imply different types of policy response.  Refugees had in fact appeared centuries earlier as distinct, named groups. From the late 15th century political authorities in the emerging nation-states of Europe devoted enormous energies to population management. Unlike the monarchies and religious authorities of an earlier era, they focused on defining and allocating national identity on the basis of various and sometimes changing cultural markers, including language and religious/sectarian affiliation. Their concern with physical frontiers was complemented by interest in socio-cultural borders: who was placed within the new nations and who outside them. National identities were ascribed and allocated as part of a process in which outsiders Strangers and Others played a key role, so that people rejected by the new nations were in fact integral to them. Some were physically excluded, some remained as “internal” enemies; both were functional to the emerging system of national societies.  These developments were associated with huge population movements from the exodus of Jews and Muslims of Spain and Portugal in the late 15th/early 16th centuries, to the flight of Calvinists of France and Germany throughout the 17th century and into the early 18th century. Both the expulsion and reception/ rejection of such communities were significant for emerging nation-states. Political authorities concerned with principles of national authenticity brought great pressure on communities of others, especially religious non-conformists, to accept the new norms. To enforce alignment with the appropriate cultural markers, these minorities were treated as alien to the wider society. Those who would not undergo religious conversion or adopt specific practices approved by the authorities were expelled; in effect they were displaced pour encourager les autres, the mass of people whom state authorities sought to unify on a national basis.  In the case of France, large numbers of Calvinists fled, some securing protection in what they called le-refuge sanctuary obtained first in Switzerland and later in other neighboring states. These Huguenots were the first to be identified as refugees’ people rejected in their countries of origin and accommodated in other emerging nation-states [see Cottret 1991: 7]. Their security was often guaranteed by the latters’ rulers, who viewed them as both an economic resource and an ideological asset; in an echo of earlier approaches, their presence was viewed as testimony to the values of the receiving society and as a marker of the latter’s social cohesion. As religious traditions of sanctuary were eroded, the state itself had become the source of refuge. It was no longer possible to invoke divine authority for protection: now the new rulers and their officials determined who candidates for asylum were.  It is clear that refugees were present at the birth of the modern state and that some played a key role in the new ideologies of nation. In one of the very rare analyses of these developments, [Soguk 1999: 244] comments that forced migrants were integral to statecraft “the art of imagining and socially producing the state’s territorial order”. They were paradoxical figures: marginal to most social discourse and to official histories but who, at key moments, had enormous ideological significance. In France, the Huguenots provided a focal point for efforts to develop ideas of patriotic attachment to the state. Those who became refugees fulfilled a similar purpose abroad. In England and Ireland an English colony ruled by a Protestant elite, they were greeted as co-religionists whose rights would be guaranteed by a nation committed to liberty.  In the 1680s, leading English and Irish politicians, religious figures and state officials conducted “a wide ranging ideological campaign” on their behalf and raised unprecedented sums of money for a special relief fund [Cottret 1991:23]. Such a welcome was not guaranteed however. A few years later, Calvinists from Germany the Palatines also requested asylum in England. They were summarily rejected and eventually deported after a high-profile campaign in which, unlike the Huguenots, they were characterized as alien and unworthy of protection. The Huguenots were subsequently allocated a place within the mainstream of British history; the Palatines were promptly forgotten.  **HISTORY IN DENIAL**  In both sending and receiving states refugees now played important roles in construction of the discourse of nation: they were “vitally productive of the normative centrality of the citizen/nation/state hierarchy” [Soguk 1999: 244]. These developments need much research and analysis by historians of the early modern period. The implications are clear, however: all the emerging nation states of Europe were associated with ideas about citizen or subject and alien, and many had direct engagements with forced migrants, among whom some were accepted as refugees. As the process of state formation spread across the continent, each and every region was affected by ideas about nation and national identity and each saw population movements associated with emergence of new states and with inter-state conflicts. At the same time, as colonizing powers brought vast areas under their control, states based upon the European model were implanted worldwide. Initially they were merely impositions but, as resistance to Europe developed, the state itself became a means of expressing aspirations for freedom and self-determination. The nation-state became a universal polity within which, suggests Nairn 1975, nationalism developed a contradictory character: “Janusfaced”, it looked back to the era of European rule and forward to the prospect of change.  The American revolutionaries of 1776 initiated two centuries of struggle against colonialism. From the slave revolts of Saint-Domingue in the 1790s to the post-Soviet realignments in the Caucasus in the 1990s, huge energies were devoted to pursuing independence and shaping new national societies. Boundaries were drawn and redrawn, often reworking colonial models with their inclusions and exclusions based upon religion, regional affiliation, ethnic identity and “tribe”. Millions of people were displaced by conflict or by treaties and settlements that established new territorial borders and cultural boundaries. Everywhere, these processes produced forced migrants people we now recognize as refugees or as Internally Displaced Persons [IDPs]. Few were seen as eligible for protection and little attention was paid to their experiences as matters of intrinsic interest. As in Europe, the refugee was everywhere and nowhere. On rare occasions refugees were allocated special roles in the national narrative. As a rule, however, they were absent; history did not observe the refugee.  **Work cited:**  On the relationship between migration and development, see, for example, Arnold (1998), Böhning and Schloetter-Paredes (1994), OECD (1994), Fischer, Martin and Straubhaar (1997), Martin and Taylor (2001), Hammar et al. (1997), Sassen (1988), *Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear and EngbergPedersen (2002).* On the causes of forced migration, see Zolberg (1983), Suhrke (1994), Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguyo (1989), Schmeidl (2001), NIDI/Eurostat (2000).  *See, for example, Barutciski (1996)* on prevention in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Hathaway (1995) on UNHCR’s involvement in prevention.  *See, for example, Lund and Mehler (1999).* Theories of conflict prevention. Like theories of migration, conflict theories can also be divided into structural, macro theories and agent-based, micro theories.  *Arnold, Fred [1998],* “The Contribution of Remittances to Economic and Social Development”, in Mary M. Kritz, Lin Lean Lim and Hania Zlotnik, eds., International Migration Systems: A Global Approach [Oxford: Clarendon Press], pp. 205-20. *Barutciski, Michael [1996],* “The Reinforcement of Non-Admission Policies and the Subversion of UNHCR: Displacement and Internal Assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina [1992-94]”, International Journal of Refugee Law 8:1/2, pp. 49-110. Bilsborrow, *Richard E. and Hania Zlotnik [1994],* “The Systems Approach and the Measurement of the Determinants of International Migration”, Workshop on the Root Causes of International Migration, Luxembourg, 14-16 December. Böhning, W. R. [1984], Studies in International Labour Migration [London and Basingstoke: Macmillan]. *Böhning, W. R. and M.-L. Schloetter-Paredes (1994),* Aid in Place of Migration? Selected contributions to an ILO-UNHCR meeting [Geneva: ILO].  *Boswell [2002],* “EU Policies to Prevent the Causes of Migration and Refugee Flows: An Integrated Approach?”, forthcoming, Migration-Société, Autumn 2002 [12 pp.].  Castles, Stephen and Sean Loughna [2002], “Forced Migration, Conflict and Development: Patterns of Mobility to the European Union, Causes and Policy Options”, IPPR, May.  Conflict Prevention Network (1998), Yearbook (Baden-Baden: Nomos). Crisp, Jeff (1999), “UNHCR’s Role in the Prevention of Refugee-Producing Situations”, UNHCR Geneva.  **QUESTION TWO [2]**  **What are the dynamics of conflicts as well as repression?**  This study contributes to our understanding of the dynamic relationship between protest and repression. It employs vector auto regressions to analyze daily data from six Latin American and three African countries from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The results suggest that there is a reciprocal relationship between protest and repression and that protest is consistent over time. Democracies were found to be most likely to accommodate the opposition and, at the same time, were least likely to display continuous repressive behavior. However, if faced with popular dissent, democracies were just as likely to respond with negative sanctions as other regime types, whereas negative sanctions were particularly unsuccessful to solicit dissident cooperation in democracies**.**  In the case of forced displacement, macro factors are more dominant than meso ones. Analyses of refugee producing situations have found not surprisingly that levels of displacement usually correspond to the level of violence in the country of origin [Suhrke 1994]. However, it is difficult for external actors to intervene to address these proximate causes of displacement once state repression or violent conflict is occurring. It therefore makes sense to look at the root causes, or underlying conditions which make escalation to violence or extreme acts of state repression more likely. What follows is a very general account of the causal dynamics that often lead to violent conflict and state repression, which in turn trigger large-scale forced displacement. The account is kept general so that it can "fit" most major refugee producing situations. Clearly, each particular case needs a far more detailed and nuanced explanation. This scheme is therefore intended as a basis for categorizing levels and types of policy response, rather than a stand-alone explanation for any given conflict.  One major root cause of both violence and repression is the existence of a weak or non-consolidated state. The state’s weakness may take the form of lack of external sovereignty contested borders or neighbouring states exerting a destabilizing impact; and lack of internal legitimacy. According to this schema, lack of legitimacy may stem from two often mutually reinforcing sources: the state’s failure to satisfy basic socio-economic needs, or a narrow power base.  Failure to meet socio-economic needs may be caused by exogenous factors such as natural disasters, demographic pressures or the impact of global economic trends or shocks. It may also be caused or exacerbated by state mismanagement, including poor policy planning and implementation, inequitable distribution, or corruption. Lack of legitimacy may also stem from a more fundamental perception of the state as unrepresentative, often because of a narrow ethnic composition, or because of biased distribution of rights and goods between different groups. Where there are deep social cleavages along ethnic lines, grievances over resource distribution may also take the form of ethno political conflict.  The weak states may respond to challenges to their legitimacy in different ways. One response is to seek to address grievances through policy reform, or democratization of institutions. Alternatively, the state may consolidate its power through repression. This may involve mobilizing support for a shared national identity, partly through the exclusion of “stranded” minority groups, as in the case of Ugandan Asians under Idi Amin, Kurds in Iraq, or Kosovo Albanians before 2000 [Faist 2000.65]. Repression is also likely to involve cracking down on dissidents and general infringements of civil liberties. Where the state is unable to consolidate a repressive regime in this way, a third possibility is descent into generalized violence or civil conflict. On both of the second scenarios there is likely to be forced displacement.  In the scenario of a repressive state, individual dissidents or members of particular ethnic groups may flee the regime - as in the case of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Iraqi Kurds, or opposition groups in Zimbabwe. In the second case, refugees will be fleeing civil conflict, which is likely to be fought along ethno-political lines [e.g. Bosnia, Croatia and Rwanda]. Refugees may also be fleeing generalized violence caused by inter-state war or external military intervention [e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan]. These possible sequences of events leading to displacement are represented in the chart below.  This categorization of causes at different sequences of the escalation of refugee producing situations helps define the possible forms of intervention that can be undertaken to avert proximate causes of displacement. These instruments and their limitations will be considered later in the paper. Clearly, a number of conditions will influence whether victims of repression or generalized violence are able to secure protection in a safer area of the country, a neighbouring country, or a country further afield. Enabling conditions include personal resources, possibilities for travel, the existence of ties with a particular country of asylum [networks and migration systems], and legislation in the country of destination. It should be noted that in most refugee situations the majority of displaced people do not have access to the sorts of resources and information enabling them to travel to EU countries, and therefore remain in their country or region of origin.  In the discussion of forced displacement, it was assumed that the existence of certain objective push factors is sufficient in themselves to generate flight. In the case of voluntary economic migration, by contrast, meso-level factors play a far greater role. Potential migrants are assumed to make decisions based on a relative appraisal of conditions and opportunities in places of origin and destination. This implies that they are influenced not only by macro conditions, but that their decisions are also shaped by the existence of migration systems and networks. As with the case of forced displacement, however, it is useful to trace sequences of events leading to individual and mass emigration. Again, this will allow us to define possible levels of intervention through external policy instruments.  It is now a commonplace observation that large-scale voluntary migration does not tend to occur from the poorest countries. Rather, it is far more likely to originate in countries where a significant number of people have access to sufficient resources, information and ties with countries of destination. These enabling conditions will be less widespread in the poorest countries where people gain their livelihood through subsistence farming, with little trade or contact with other areas. But there are other reasons why a larger number of migrants come from middle income countries. Emigration originates from countries experiencing a phase of socio-economic transition involving economic restructuring. This is likely to disrupt patterns of agricultural or traditional industrial production, creating unemployment or reducing incomes.  Disparities of income and employment between different areas of the country are likely to generate mainly rural-urban migration. This is often initially internal migration, but as urban areas become saturated by migrants, it will usually evolve into international migration. These macro pressures linked to industrialization may be exacerbated by other conditions. One of these is demographic factors, with population growth creating additional pressures on labour markets, increasing the scarcity of cultivable land, or creating environmental degradation. Another is the social disruption created by industrialization, which may upset traditional social structures. For example, the arrival of multinational companies employing local workers can create a large pool of low-skilled industrial wage labour in towns, with high migratory potential. Relocation of the firm and the ensuing redundancies could act as a trigger for emigration of these employees. Industrialization is often also accompanied by the increasing participation of women in employment, implying far greater independence for women and making them more likely to emigrate to find better chances abroad. Migration is more likely to occur between countries within a migration system, comprising relatively close trade, historical, cultural, linguistic or other links. Such links are often established with middle income countries with proximity to receiving countries, who are important trade partners or recipients of foreign direct investment, such as the countries of Central Europe and the EU, or Central America and the US. Alternatively, they may stem from a previous bilateral agreement for recruiting migrant labour, as in the case of 1950s and 1960s "guest worker" schemes between a number of European states and countries in southern Europe, Turkey and North Africa.  Former colonial ties are also significant in forging specialties, especially where the ex-colonial power has had a fairly open approach to citizenship and immigration, as in the cases of the UK and France. Industrialization is likely to intensify already established links, with increased access to media and western goods, implying greater exposure to western culture and raising expectations about opportunities in developed capitalist states. Economic opportunities in destination countries are also of crucial importance in influencing decisions to migrate and the direction of flows. Thus in addition to macro push factors and migration systems, there are a number of significant "pull" factors in receiving countries.  Probably the most important of these is the widespread demand for cheap, low-skilled labour. As manufacturing companies have been forced to become more flexible and competitive under the pressures of globalization, many have become increasingly dependent on the supply of low-cost, flexible labour, often employed on an irregular basis. Most countries are also dependent on additional low skilled seasonal labour in tourism and agriculture, as well as domestic help. Other relevant conditions in the destination country include migration legislation, such as bilateral agreements or other quota systems for labour migration.  Sustaining factors  Once initiated, migration from particular countries or areas within them will often be self-perpetuating. Initial pioneer migrants will be able to provide resources and support that make the move much less expensive and risky for future migrants within the same social network. In places of origin, migration of family members may be generally perceived as the best strategy for increasing incomes or social status, or for young people it may represent an opportunity for a more successful life. Hence networks not only reduce the costs and risks of migration, but can also create a "culture" of migration in sending areas. Such chain migration may continue despite legislation in receiving countries designed to restrict immigration. However, even this phenomenon of self-sustaining migration will decrease in due course. At some point a change in macro conditions will lead to a decline in the attractiveness of migration. There is no convincing general theory as to when this point is reached. Some scholars have suggested that emigration declines as income differentials between sending and receiving countries narrow to around 4:1, but there are other cases where it has declined at a differential of 10 or 12:1. More generally, emigration is likely to decrease when industrial development produces expanded employment opportunities for potential emigrants and returning migrants. Under these conditions, there is also likely to be a demand for additional low-skilled labour, generating immigration from other countries. Thus in the former emigration countries of Southern Europe, and more recently in some Central European countries, a decline in emigration has been accompanied by an increase in immigration flows. Existing legislative practice in EU states implies extremely limited possibilities for the regular migration of low-skilled workers. Where there is no possibility for entry through family reunion or a temporary labour scheme, the only other option for potential emigrants is illegal entry, or legal entry on a temporary visa and subsequent overstay.  In the case of illegal entry, in most cases this will require quite substantial financial resources to pay for forged travel documents and tickets, or to pay to be smuggled into an EU state. As widely documented, such journeys will often involve considerable risks. For those with the possibility of obtaining a temporary tourist visa including those from CEECs into Schengen countries, the feasibility of irregular residence and employment will depend on contacts and networks in the country of destination.  In all cases, the costs, risks and feasibility of illegal entry or overstay and irregular employment will be substantially affected by migration control mechanisms, especially in countries of destination. Border checks, internal controls on residents and employer sanctions obviously make immigration and irregular stay more difficult. Thus restrictive legislation and its enforcement through policing, border controls and sanctions can limit these enabling conditions for migration. However, two qualifications need to be stressed. Firstly, such control measures are essentially a blunt instrument, failing to discriminate between voluntary migrants and refugees. And secondly, measures to limit these enabling conditions do not eliminate the root and proximate causes of migration, and may therefore fail to deter people from attempting to emigrate. Instead, they will often have the unintended consequence of encouraging people to devote increased resources to more sophisticated trafficking techniques, and to take more risks in their means of travel. As in the discussion of forced displacement, this schema can help categorize different levels of policy response corresponding to levels of causes.  Policy responses; The list of instruments applicable to preventing the causes of migration and displacement is familiar. Various academic and EU policy documents have listed human rights, democratization and the rule of law, humanitarian assistance, development aid, trade policy, environment and demographics policies, security policy and conflict prevention. However, such inventories of EU responses tend to be too general and unstructured to provide a useful framework for policy, reflecting an overly simplistic “one-size-fits-all” mentality. Instead, it is more constructive to assess possible responses on three criteria:   * Their potential contribution to addressing the causes of displacement, as set out earlier. This will involve categorizing instruments according to their impact on the different types of causes underlying, proximate, enabling and sustaining factors, and at different phases in the refugee or migration producing situation; * The comparative advantage of the EU in defining and implementing the relevant policies. The question here is how far the EU has the competence and capability to exert an impact through the relevant policy instrument - especially as compared to other regional or international organizations, or EU member states. * Finally, it is important to consider the consistency of a migration preventive approach with other EU external relations priorities, including trade, development cooperation, common foreign and security policy [CFSP] and humanitarian assistance. Of particular importance are potential divergences in the substance of policy goals, and in priority countries and regions   **Averting the causes of forced displacement.**  There have been few explicit attempts to address the root causes of forced displacement. One exception was the 1996 Regional Conference to address problems of refugees, displaced persons, and returnees in the CIS, organized by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration. Arguably, comprehensive approaches such as the International Conference on Central American Refugees from 1989-94 have also been preventive in so far as they have aimed to limit further displacement. However, most preventive efforts have been aimed at the more immediate objectives of stopping persecution or violent conflict once it is already occurring, as in the case of Kosovo, encouraging displaced people to stay in regions in origin, as in Bosnia, Iraq and Haiti. This section will start with a brief discussion of this form of proximate prevention, then going on to consider root causes.  **Addressing proximate causes**  Earlier two main sets of proximate causes were highlighted: severe state repression involving serious human rights abuse and the persecution of minority groups; and violent conflict. The prospects for successful intervention at this proximate phase are limited. In the case of severely repressive states, regimes with an established pattern of coercive rule or persecution of minority groups may be unresponsive to internal or external pressures for reform. Much will depend on how the state assesses the risks and benefits of reform. This will depend on the level and internal dynamics of internal opposition; as well as the state’s level of dependence on the EU for trade, development assistance, political support, or potential EU membership. Where the second factor is present, the EU will have more margin for influencing the government to introduce measures to promote democratization, human rights, and projects to strengthen civil society.  In the case of violent conflict, intervention at this proximate phase may be even more difficult. There is ample literature and evidence of the shortcomings of military intervention to prevent or contain civil conflict, and in any case the EU currently has a limited role to play in such campaigns. The EU has had a relatively greater role in post-conflict reconstruction of the sort implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo or Afghanistan. This type of reconstruction activity can facilitate refugee repatriation and reintegration, and can be understood as a form of prevention of renewed.  **Work cited**:  *Martin, Philip L*. and J. Edward Taylor (2001), “Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Policies”, in Aristide R. Zolberg and Peter M. Benda, eds., Global migrants, Global Refugees: Problems and Solutions (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001), pp. 95-120.  *Miall, Hugh (2000),* "Preventing Potential Conflicts: Assessing the Impact of 'Light' and 'Deep' Conflict Prevention in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans", in M. Lund and G. Rasamoeline, eds., The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments (Bade-Baden: Nomos), pp. 63-88.  *European Commission (2000),* Communication form the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy, COM (2000) 757 final, Brussels, 22 November 2000.  *European Commission (2001a),* Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM (2001) 211 final, Brussels, 11 April.  *European Commission (2001b),* “The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries”, Communication to from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (COM (2001) 252 final, Brussels, 8 May.  *European Council (1994),* Presidency Conclusions, Edinburgh. European Council (1999), Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, SN 2000/99, 15-16 October.  **QUESTION THREE [3]**  **With aid of a diagram, explain the dynamics of forced migration?**  Migration is one of the most contentious and relevant issues of our time, as evidenced by the increasing numbers of migrants and displaced persons and by inflammatory political discourse throughout the world. This paper discusses the underlying causes of recent migration flows and crises such as the civilian centered nature of recent conflicts, persistent underdevelopment, climate change, and political impasse that prevents conflict resolution and adequate management of migration flows. Further, the paper focuses on Human migration as the movement of people from one place to another with the intentions of the distinction between involuntary fleeing political conflict and natural disaster. At levels of roughly three [3] percent the share of migrantsamong the world.  Despite the fact that migration is almost as old as humanity itself, and obviously helped shape societies throughout the world, few topics are as contentious or as relevant today. Migration is a fact of life for many of those who hail from the world’s poorest countries at least for those lucky enough to survive often dangerous journeys. Meanwhile in many advanced economies, particularly in the United States and the European Union, anti-immigrant fervor is contributing to the rise of populist politicians. The rising number of migrants and increasing focus on migration reflects multiple trends, including the civilian centered nature of recent conflicts. The overwhelming failure of developed countries to respond to influxes of migrants and to manage the integration of existing migrant populations has added fuel to the fire in Brussels and Washington alike. However, along with climate change, migration will be a defining issue of our era under different circumstance today as the causes of migration.  Exogenous causes of under-development  Contested borders, destabilizing neighbours  Severe state repression  Deprivation of basic needs  State mismanagement  **Mobilization of support along ethnic or social lines (by state and/or opposition groups)**  Violent conflict  Inequitable distribution of rights and resources  Narrow power base, lack of  This categorization of causes at different sequences of the escalation of refugee producing situations helps define the possible forms of intervention that can be undertaken to avert proximate causes of displacement. These instruments and their limitations will be considered later in the paper. Clearly, a number of conditions will influence whether victims of repression or generalized violence are able to secure protection in a safer area of the country, a neighbouring country, or a country further afield. Enabling conditions include personal resources, possibilities for travel, the existence of ties with a particular country of asylum [networks and migration systems], and legislation in the country of destination. It should be noted that in most refugee situations the majority of displaced people do not have access to the sorts of resources and information enabling them to travel to EU countries, and therefore remain in their country or region of origin  In the discussion of forced displacement, it was assumed that the existence of certain objective push factors is sufficient in themselves to generate flight. In the case of voluntary economic migration, by contrast, meso level factors play a far greater role. Potential migrants are assumed to make decisions based on a relative appraisal of conditions and opportunities in places of origin and destination. This implies that they are influenced not only by macro conditions, but that their decisions are also shaped by the existence of migration systems and networks. As with the case of forced displacement, however, it is useful to trace sequences of events leading to individual and mass emigration. Again, this will allow us to define possible levels of intervention through external policy instruments  It is now a commonplace observation that large-scale voluntary migration does not tend to occur from the poorest countries. Rather, it is far more likely to originate in countries where a significant number of people have access to sufficient resources, information and ties with countries of destination. These enabling conditions will be less widespread in the poorest countries where people gain their livelihood through subsistence farming, with little trade or contact with other areas. But there are other reasons why a larger number of migrants come from middle income countries. Emigration originates from countries experiencing a phase of socio-economic transition involving economic restructuring. This is likely to disrupt patterns of agricultural or traditional industrial production, creating unemployment or reducing incomes. Disparities of income and employment between different areas of the country are likely to generate mainly rural-urban migration. This is often initially internal migration, but as urban areas become saturated by migrants, it will usually evolve into international migration.  These macro pressures linked to industrialization may be exacerbated by other conditions. One of these is demographic factors, with population growth creating additional pressures on labour markets, increasing the scarcity of cultivable land, or creating environmental degradation. Another is the social disruption created by industrialization, which may upset traditional social structures. For example, the arrival of multinational companies employing local workers can create a large pool of low-skilled industrial wage labour in towns, with high migratory potential. Relocation of the firm and the ensuing redundancies could act as a trigger for emigration of these employees. Industrialization is often also accompanied by the increasing participation of women in employment, implying far greater independence for women and making them more likely to emigrate to find better chances abroad.  Migration is more likely to occur between countries within a migration system, comprising relatively close trade, historical, cultural, linguistic or other links. Such links are often established with middle income countries with proximity to receiving countries, who are important trade partners or recipients of foreign direct investment, such as the countries of Central Europe and the EU, or Central America and the US. Alternatively, they may stem from a previous bilateral agreement for recruiting migrant labour, as in the case of 1950s and 1960s "guest worker" schemes between a number of European states and countries in southern Europe, Turkey and North Africa. Former colonial ties are also significant in forging specialties, especially where the ex-colonial power has had a fairly open approach to citizenship and immigration, as in the cases of the UK and France. Industrialization is likely to intensify already established links, with increased access to media and western goods, implying greater exposure to western culture and raising expectations about opportunities in developed capitalist states. Economic opportunities in destination countries are also of crucial importance in influencing decisions to migrate and the direction of flows. Thus in addition to macro push factors and migration systems, there are a number of significant "pull" factors in receiving countries.  Probably the most important of these is the widespread demand for cheap, low-skilled labour. As manufacturing companies have been forced to become more flexible and competitive under the pressures of globalization, many have become increasingly dependent on the supply of low-cost, flexible labour, often employed on an irregular basis. Most countries are also dependent on additional low skilled seasonal labour in tourism and agriculture, as well as domestic help. Other relevant conditions in the destination country include migration legislation, such as bilateral agreements or other quota systems for labour migration.  This generation has a unique opportunity to implement sensible policies that tackle the root causes of migration and minimize the costs and maximize the benefits associated with migration. Doing so successfully will require almost unprecedented levels of international as well as public-private sector cooperation, in a time when many developed countries are exhibiting little appetite for international engagement. Still, policymakers have no choice but to work toward sustainable, long-term solutions. The failure to do so can only lead to more deaths on the Mediterranean and every other human smuggling route, increased fragmentation in the US and the EU, and lost opportunities to benefit from the orderly movement of ideas, technology, and labor. The remainder of this paper explores the types and underlying causes of migration, future trends likely to impact migration, and most importantly and suggested policies to promote the sensible management of migration. International institutions that work on migration issues typically distinguish between two broad categories of migrants, based on each group’s perceived reasons for migrating. “Voluntary” or “economic” migration usually refers to population movements spurred by economic reasons, when people “choose” to migrate in search of better livelihoods. “Forced” migration refers instead to population movements stemming from violent conflict, persecution, or other situations that oblige people to seek refuge elsewhere.Per the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees “1951 Convention” and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees “1967 Protocol”, a “refugee” is a forced migrant “who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. Internally-displaced persons constitute a third and important category, referring to people who have not crossed international borders but were nonetheless forced to leave their place of origin due to conflict, environmental degradation, extreme poverty, etc.  While these distinctions are important for framing the debate on migration and targeting policies to address various causes of migration, it is much more important to recognize the blurred nature of the divide between voluntary and forced migration as well as internal movements of people.  After all, how “voluntary” is it to move from a place that offers no viable means to provide for one’s family? Would someone who truly had a “choice” knowingly risk death for an improbable shot at prosperity? The complex reasons that lead people to migrate often make it difficult to draw a clear distinction between voluntary and forced migration, which in turn makes it difficult to identify and provide adequate protection to refugees as required by international law. The term “mixed migration” denotes migration flows that include both “forced” and “voluntary” migration.  Despite decades of growth in emerging economies, few countries have advanced from low-income to middle- or higher-income status, and gaps in wealth and overall well-being remain large. In particular, job creation has not kept pace with growing working-age populations in much of the developing world, and wages remain lower than in developed economies despite years of growth. Additionally, fast economic growth in low-income countries is actually leading to increased migration, since more people now have the economic means to migrate, and gaps between rich and poor countries remain quite large.  The United Arab Emirates offers an interesting example, given the open economic and labor policies that have led it to become one of the most migrant-dependent countries in the world. Migrants to the UAE hail primarily from lower middle-income South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and many are employed as domestic workers. Poverty and lack of economic opportunities in South Asia have led millions to take advantage of the UAE’s temporary guest-worker program, called the Kafala Sponsorship System.  As noted above, forced migration usually results from violent conflicts such as civil wars, and often leads to loss of national protection that warrants refugee status determination. While there are sometimes legal avenues to migrate from forced migration situations, most forced migrants and refugees must initially move through irregular, often difficult and/or life-threatening channels. The most relevant contemporary example is the large outflow of migrants fleeing Syria’s brutal civil war, now entering its sixth year, which has resulted in almost 5 million refugees. Many Syrians have crossed the Turkish-Syrian border, often attempting to reach Europe afterward. Iraq and Afghanistan, ravaged by over a decade of war, are also heavily represented among those trying to reach Europe. Dadaab in Kenya the largest refugee camp in the world hosts hundreds of thousands of Somalis because decades of conflict have rendered their country essentially a failed state.  In the short to medium term, two primary factors will impact migration. The first is the outcome of current conflicts, particularly whether parties can find a political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Migration policy changes in key migrant destinations i.e, the United State and the Europe will be the other shaping force. Both factors will have long-term consequences. Nonetheless, political solutions to current conflicts could lead to decreases in the number of people attempting dangerous border crossings. Additionally, migration policy reforms to speed up asylum applications or increase legal avenues for migration could have imminent consequences for millions of people currently inhabiting refugee camps and detention centers. Unfortunately, neither seems likely to occur any time soon due to political impasse, a topic discussed in more depth in subsequent sections.  On the other hand, climate change and economic development will influence future migration trends over the long term. As mentioned above, the impact of climate change is already being felt across Africa and the Middle East, as prolonged droughts, desertification, and more frequent natural disasters are already eroding livelihoods and leading to displacement. This presents a particular challenge, given that the existing international legal framework for protecting refugees was established half a century ago, well before policymakers recognized the imminent threat of climate-induced migration.  The Need for Better Management of Migration in Conflict situation, underdevelopment, and climate change will continue to affect us for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, history suggests that people will find ways to move while the underlying causes of migration persist, regardless of efforts to stop it. No wall can be high enough, no border patrol sufficient; as long as there is demand for migration, people will find creative means and routes. It is therefore in everyone’s interest to implement sensible policy solutions to manage migration flows in a way that minimizes the human and economic costs associated and maximizes benefits for both sending and receiving countries.  Finally, although the social and cultural effects of migration cannot be measured as directly as the economic benefits described above, the interaction of multiple cultures has clearly helped shape modern American culture, particularly in its large and diverse urban centers. In Europe as well, demographic changes due to immigration are redefining traditional ideas of what it means to be European. This presents unique challenges as described below, but can also present unique opportunities for cultural enrichment.  Despite these benefits, however, it is imperative to recognize the economic and social costs of migration in order to devise effective policies to minimize them. Downward pressure on wages given increased labor supplies is an obvious issue although it is important to remember that in many cases, immigrants do not compete directly with receiving-country populations because they tend to work in other industries. Nonetheless, industrialized countries are still reeling from the devastating effects of the recent financial crisis, and employment levels have not recovered. Europe faces particular challenges with extremely high youth unemployment in certain countries for instance Spain and Italy. In the US, technological change and other factors have limited employment opportunities for low-skilled workers an issue that President Donald Trump capitalized on during his campaign by blaming unauthorized immigrants. For sending countries, on the other hand, “brain drain” effects can hinder development, particularly in countries were persistently poor conditions discourage return migration.  In addition to the economic challenges of migration in a time when developed countries themselves experience financial duress, social costs from migration can be high and can impact both state and human security. The failure to integrate migrant populations into society can lead to increased social frictions and, in the worst of cases, to radicalization among immigrant communities. This is particularly evident in Europe right now, where countries have struggled to identify and to contain terrorist threats stemming from migrant communities. This is less prevalent in the US, which has higher violent crime rates generally and where Caucasians are more likely to commit violent crimes such as mass shootings.Nonetheless, high-profile devastating attacks in recent years have fueled fears that immigrants pose a security threat to both the state and its citizens.  Importantly, we must also remember the human security threats to migrants themselves as an important social cost of migration. This can range from dangers and abuses during the journeys often facilitated by criminal smuggling networks, to lack of legal protections from workplace abuses for migrants working in the underground economy. It is now a commonplace observation that large-scale voluntary migration does not tend to occur from the poorest countries. Rather, it is far more likely to originate in countries where a significant number of people have access to sufficient resources, information and ties with countries of destination. These enabling conditions will be less widespread in the poorest countries where people gain their livelihood through subsistence farming, with little trade or contact with other areas. But there are other reasons why a larger number of migrants come from middle income countries. Emigration originates from countries experiencing a phase of socio-economic transition involving economic restructuring. This is likely to disrupt patterns of agricultural or traditional industrial production, creating unemployment or reducing incomes. These macro pressures linked to industrialization may be exacerbated by other conditions. One of these is demographic factors, with population growth creating additional pressures on labour markets, increasing the scarcity of cultivable land, or creating environmental degradation. Another is the social disruption created by industrialization, which may upset traditional social structures. For example, the arrival of multinational companies employing local workers can create a large pool of low-skilled industrial wage labour in towns, with high migratory potential. Relocation of the firm and the ensuing redundancies could act as a trigger for emigration of these employees. Industrialization is often also accompanied by the All of this underscores the need for effective policies to minimize the costs of migration to states and migrants themselves. As recent events in Europe and the US demonstrate, human and state security are inevitably intertwined: the failure to manage migration in a way that preserves social cohesion is now threatening the daily functioning of our societies.  *However, need for better Policies* for Migration Management i.e. respect for universal human rights should lie at the core of global efforts to manage migration. All migrants regardless of whether they are irregular migrants, voluntary or forced, refugees or IDPs should be treated with dignity and respect per the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. During times when the President of the United States has called Mexican immigrants “rapists” and “bad hombres,” and the potential next president of France has compared Muslims praying in public to Nazi occupation, it is more important than ever to remember that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.  In addition to respect for universal human rights, the fundamental principles enshrined in the legal framework for the protection of refugees should also govern migration policy reform. Chief among these is the principle of non-refoulement, which holds that no one can expel or return a refugee against his or her will to a territory where he or she “fears threats to life or freedom.” In addition, the 1951 Convention states that its provisions must be applied to all without discriminating on the basis of sex, age, disability, sexuality, etc., and that refugees should not be penalized for migrating through irregular channels, given that this is often unavoidable when seeking asylum. The 1951 Convention also establishes standards for the treatment of refugees including access to work, education, the justice system, and documentation which states should respect and promote via their asylum and integration policies. The following sections discuss policy measures that could aid in the management of voluntary, forced, and mixed migration, keeping in mind the principles described above.  The needs policy reform to ensure adequate burden sharing. This could be achieved by setting quotas for resettlement and possibly establishing fines for countries that choose to opt out, and creating an EU-wide border control force and processes together with a common budget.In addition, the EU needs to establish uniform procedures for processing asylum applications, determining the status of asylum-seekers, and for the treatment of migrants in the interim all of which currently vary greatly among member states.Importantly, as well, the EU needs a pan European approach to refugee relocation, resettlement, and integration. This means conducting needs assessments at a macro level throughout the EU, to identify the specific places and industries where Europe stands to gain the most from additional workers, given the demographic deficit that will imminently weigh on its health and pension systems.  Both the EU and US should also consider three additional policy avenues. The first is increasing legal pathways for migration, which currently overwhelmingly favor high-skilled workers. Increasing legal pathways to migration including for low-skilled workers could reduce reliance on irregular migration routes. And if properly designed i.e., on the basis of rigorous data analysis such policies could target work permits to industries and geographic locations that would benefit the most. Along with policies to promote safe and orderly movement of people, migrant integration needs to be at the top of policymakers’ agendas in both the US and EU. A country’s ability to integrate migrants into broader society is essential for minimizing the economic, social, and security costs of migration, and thus maximizing its benefits.65 For example, studies have identified a strong correlation between integration policies and the public’s perceived level of threat from immigrants.  Additionally, the international community as a whole must take several steps to improve the management of forced migration and refugee situations. At the institutional level, international actors can take various measures to improve global management of migration and refugee crises, particularly within the UN system. This should include taking formal steps to manage the impact of climate-induced migration. One possibility would be to expand the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention to include people who lose national protection as a result of climate change e.g, as in the case of island nations that will likely cease to exist due to rising sea levels. Such measures should be accompanied by new processes and resources allocated to assist people displaced by climate change, even if they do not fully lose national protection.  **In Conclusion;** a substantial discussion has shown that conflict is a major push factor for forced migration. In contrast, the pull factors that make some destinations more desirable than others, as witnessed by the uneven distribution of asylum applications throughout Europe, remain poorly understood. Furthermore, the impact of particular spikes in asylum applications, which likely introduce structural breaks into long time series, is generally less well understood than the micro-effects of specific conflicts or the longer-term distribution of global applications. We seek a middle way, by developing spike-specific panels that look at movements between origin and destination country pairs during so-called “crisis periods”. This allows us to understand both what causes individuals to leave their country of origin and what causes their selection into particular destinations.  **Work Cited:**  *Barutciski, Michael (1996),* “The Reinforcement of Non-Admission Policies and the Subversion of UNHCR: Displacement and Internal Assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-94)”, International Journal of Refugee Law 8:1/2, pp. 49-110.  *Bilsborrow, Richard E. and Hania Zlotnik (1994),* “The Systems Approach and the Measurement of the Determinants of International Migration”, Workshop on the Root Causes of International Migration, Luxembourg, 14-16 December.  *Böhning, W. R. (1984),* Studies in International Labour Migration (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan)  *Arnold, Fred (1998),* “The Contribution of Remittances to Economic and Social Development”, in Mary M. Kritz, Lin Lean Lim and Hania Zlotnik, eds., International Migration Systems: A Global Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 205-20  *European Commission (1991),* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration, SEC (91) 1855 final, Brussels, 23 October 1991.  *European Commission (1994),* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM (94) 23 final, Brussels, 23 February 1994.  *European Commission (2000),* Communication form the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy, COM (2000) 757 final, Brussels, 22 November 2000.  **ATTEMPT QUESTION FOUR:**  **EXPLAIN IN DETAIL THE ROOTS CAUSES OF FORCED MIGRATION?**  There have been few explicit attempts to address the root causes of forced migration or displacement. One exception was the 1996 Regional Conference to address problems of refugees, displaced persons, and returnees in the CIS, organized by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] and the International Organization for Migration [IOM]. Arguably, comprehensive approaches such as the International Conference on Central American Refugees from 1989-94 have also been preventive in so far as they have aimed to limit further displacement. However, most preventive efforts have been aimed at the more immediate objectives of stopping persecution or violent conflict once it is already occurring, as in the case of Kosovo, or encouraging displaced people to stay in regions in origin, as in Bosnia, Iraq and Haiti. This section will start with a brief discussion of this form of proximate prevention, then going on to consider root causes. Once may justified that root causes of forced migration'' or root causes of migratory movements traditionally are divided into ' Push and Pull factors'. Since our topic is concentrated on ' forced migratory movements ' the emphasis will be on the ' Push factors' and ' Pull factors' will be dealt with only in so far they are of importance to elucidate direction, size or speed of the forced migratory movement.  The following distinction and division is, of course, only analytical and not ' ideal typisch' Their separation is artificial and many, if not most, reasons are overlapping and interlinked when it comes down to explain the coming to pass of a given forced migratory movement.  Addressing proximate causes on forced migration; Earlier two main sets of proximate causes were highlighted: severe state repression involving serious human rights abuse and the persecution of minority groups; and violent conflict. The prospects for successful intervention at this proximate phase are limited. In the case of severely repressive states, regimes with an established pattern of coercive rule or persecution of minority groups may be unresponsive to internal or external pressures for reform. Much will depend on how the state assesses the risks and benefits of reform. This will depend on the level and internal dynamics of internal opposition; as well as the state’s level of dependence on the EU for trade, development assistance, political support, or potential EU membership. Where the second factor is present, the EU will have more margin for influencing the government to introduce measures to promote democratization, human rights, and projects to strengthen civil society as stipulated below in the discussion: -  **TRADITIONAL TENSIONS AND ENMITY**  There are enmities in this world which are as old as human memory. This enmity can be on historic, ethnic, social, religious, political, cultural or racial grounds. They are f actual, without anybody being able to recall or unravel reasons for or origins of this enmity. My own experience here is confined to the conflict in Northern Ireland, which is a relatively ' uncomplicated’, since well documented, conflict.  The arguments and reasoning taken from the past is utterly irrelevant for any attempt to resolve the present hatred. They are merely used to justify the existing enmity. Historic tensions and enmity of this kind develops its own irrational logic and dynamic and will continue until the end of times. What is valid for Northern Ireland, does also apply for conflicts such as Sunnites and Iran, Tamils and Singhalese in Sri Lanka, Serbs and Croats in former Yugoslavia. Those traditional enmities and conflicts have been exacerbated by the process of historical tension and enmity.  **POST-IMPERIAL AND POST-COLONIAL STATE- AND NATION BUILDING"**  First a clarifying explanation: The sovereign nation-state is today the prevalent model for political and international organization and relation worldwide. Ideally, this concept implies that organizational unit, the State, comprises nation, the "Staatsvolk", being of one race, culture, religion, living on one territory. The sovereign states around the turn of this century in September 1990, tendency steeply increasing. All this is the result of the breakdown of the historic "Binnenimperien", namely Austria/Hungary, The Osman Empire and cum grano salts- the czarist/soviet Empire, and the overseas Empires of the Spanish, British, French and Portuguese.  Both in the post-World War [WW] I peace treaties of Sevres, St.Germain, Trianon and Neuilly and in the 'division' of the colonial overseas- Empires, borders were drawn not just in regard to ethnic and national homogeneity, but often also out of strategic and power-balancing interests of those in power and control: Both the victorious powers of WWI and the 'mother countries' looked for possibilities to limit further unrest and danger and at the same time retain influence in the way the post-war or post-division order is run in future. Referring back to what was discussed, there are three categories of tensions deepened by this process: -  Another factor led to forced migration was violence caused by and directed against those whose territorial claims were overlooked in this reshaping of the political outlook of the world, most noteworthy Armenians, Palestinians and Kurds. Violence due to the attempt of the newly erected states to incorporate parts of the "Staatsvolk" living outside the state territory. For example, Ethiopia/Somalia fighting for the Ogaden, Pakistan/India fighting for Kashmir. Here one has to note that the existence of authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia succeeded to suppress such conflicts from breaking out for as long a time as they themselves existed - What we witness now in the area which I want to call the "Eurasian Crises Half-Moon", an area reaching from the Balkan to the Caucasus and Kurdistan down to the Near and Middle East [Kuwait and the Gulf War!] are not in the least resumptions of those historical enmities discussed and neglects inherent in the post WWI order.  There is another tension inherent in this process of State and Nation building: The intensifying conflicts between the majority and minority population within these newly-created Nation-States. Those tensions, again all too often traditional, were in the times of the colonization often utilized by the colonial power to play one population group off against the other according to the motto 'divide et imperia' Sometimes. Therefore, a minority group a tribe, clan ethnic group" or certain social class was used to rule, with the help of the colonial power, the majority of the population. It is easy to imagine what happened, when the protective hand of the colonial power was withdrawn from those minorities. The consequences range from systematic discrimination to expulsion and genocide.  The Nation-State ideology also provides two further key-ideas or ideals which were and are apt legitimation for oppressive actions against minorities: The first concept is that of the homogeneity of the Staatsvolk within a Nation State which is, for example, the underlying justification for the forcibly resettlement of millions of people on the Balcans in the wake of the 1. and 2. Balcan War and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, but can also be used to justify events like ethnical cleansing, which we witness at present in Yugoslavia.  **OPPRESSION BY TOTALITARIAN REGIMES**  As a matter of fact, we state that the course of state and nation those countries dismissed into independence all too often resulted not in participatory and pluralist structures, but rather into totalitarian regimes which were used by the ruling elite tribe, clan, class, family etc. to defend and preserve their interests against the rest of the population. This oppression can be openly violent i.e. by means of direct persecution of minorities or indirect by concentrating political and economic power in the hands of the ruling elite.  The justification for their proceeding can be religious Sunnites, Shi 'its Bahai 'is, Hindus/Sikhs ethnic Indonesia/Timor, Khmer Rouge/Vietnamese and Chinese, ideological in communist orientated countries directed against 'Agents of Imperialism and Class Enemies ', in capitalist orientated countries directed against 'Agents of Communism and subversive elements', a popular means of terror here are death squads and Punitive Expeditions) or the 'national interest' and 'public order' all too often a synonym with the interests of the ruling elite. At any rate, oppression by a totalitarian regime of any kind creates counter-violence by means of terror Khalistan, guerilla warfare [Peru], open rebellion [Sudan, Biafra, Katanga] and civil war what else could adequately characterize that which was going on in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua? All those tensions described were and still yet again exacerbated.  **LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR**  Both post WWII super powers actively attempted to expand their global influence by building and securing so-called 'informal Empires'. The famous examples on part of the Soviet Union are Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan, on part of the USA their activities in their *own* 'backyard ', resulting in the Putsch against Allende in Chile and the systematic support of anticommunist regimes and movements in Central and Latin America".  It is argued that in the times after World War II, the ideological struggle between East and West *with* all its political, military, financial and socio-economic implications and dimensions was the major root-cause underlying refugee movements whereas "prior to World War II ethnic conflict was considered the primary cause of refugee flows". The end of the Cold War did not terminate the tensions created by those policies;  **1**. There remains a huge arsenal of weaponry on every side of those involved in these conflicts.  **2**. The withdrawal of the super-powers from whole regions in this world created a power vacuum which is actively attempted to be filled by regional powers. Thus the Gulf War from Iraqs point of view was not only the attempt to 'rectify mistakes ‘made by post-colonial border-drawings Iraqs historic claim to Kuwait as IXX. province, but also the effort to secure its role as regional power in the Middle East. Similar, although more sophisticated attempts can be seen by India and its policies in the Asiatic-Pacific region.  **3**. Since the arms-manufacturing industry of the former super-powers and their allies cannot be changed to peaceful use overnight, arms trading is and will remain a lucrative business, which again, delays the energy put into restructuring and -building of those industrial facilities, combined with and the desperate need of especially former Warsaw Pact countries to obtain hard currency- export and trade continues unabated, although often disguised and via a sophisticated network of intermediary dealers".  **4**. The end of the Cold War resulted in huge amounts of stockpiles of superfluous weaponry which now more often than not just 'disappear' rather than being destroyed under international supervision.  **5** - The self-imposed restrictions of the former super-powers are misused for their own advantages by other arms producing countries who now try to satisfy the 'demands' of the market. As example may serve "China 's substantial sales to Sudan with Iranian financing" To sum it up: Never before in human history it was so easy and so cheap to obtain arms of all kinds- Consequentially, never before in human history it was so easy for conflict parties to supply themselves with means to conduct their deadly ends and all its consequences forced mass migratory movements.  **“Economical mismanagement and misplacement of developmental aid"**  With the colonizing people came not just soldiers and civil servants. They also imported and implanted their economical and educational systems in their colonies. This resulted in the destruction or violent, because its uselessness in competing with the master 's system of tradition methods of production and education and the imposition of system which originated in and satisfied the requirements of culture and society which was alien, thus unsuited, to the one being colonized. By forcing them to adopt this system if they wanted to have any share in the 'game' prescribed by the powerful, they raised a small elite of people educated and benefitting by the western ways. Due to those influences, they often felt more 'kindred in spirit' with the culture of the colonizers than with the brothers and sisters of their country of origin when the colonizers withdrew their direct influence, their indirect influence continued, since the economic and educational links to the 'motherland' remained and the implanted structures stayed behind and were upheld by this small elite which was interested to maintain their benefits.  Needless to say that corruption resulted from this attitude as well, often purposely utilized by those who also wanted to get or retain a foot in the door of domestic affairs within this country. This, of course, applies to countries in Asia, Africa and Central/Latin America. We saw why it is a rare case that the ruling elite attempted to do something which benefits the whole country and not just one specific group, they soon realized that they were ill prepared for taking on this task when their country was dismissed into independence. The result is that those elites had to seek advice by those who promised success in running a country: On offer for a long time was the eastern socialist model based on central planning and the western capitalist model based on the forces of market economy. Mistakes were made in both attempts to 'export' a system developed for a different socio-cultural setting.  To give an example for the mistakes made by following the eastern model, I want to refer to the agricultural area, where communists promoted on ideological grounds collectivization as the ultimate way of production and community building. That this lead even in the heartland of communism to irreversible ecological disasters, was either not so visible in those days or diligently ignored". Besides similar disasters occurring now elsewhere, this way of production often also suppressed traditional means of agriculture which had been orientated on the organizational structure of family and clans rather than larger, ' functional' units, it also did not take into account problems arising from the use and maintenance of machinery which could not be mastered by the people; or for which there were, in case of breakdown, no replacement parts. The use of machinery made plenty of people redundant since 1 machine could do the work of whole labour units under the older structures.  As far as developmental aid from the west is concerned, it is known''' that most projects did not benefit so much the poor regions, thus being devised to combat poverty, but rather those who used those projects to sell their machinery and technical know-how. Building barriers for the production of electricity are a perfect example in case: First of all, thousands of people are losing their home and livelihood such as farming or agricultural land’, then huge and prestigious projects are constructed which are of no use since the follow-up industrialization does not take place. The same applies to other prestigious but oversized projects such as Itaipu or Narmade in India'"'. Ironically, there is justified concern that these kinds of tendencies will continue since 95% of all research, technical innovation and development is being conducted in countries of the First World''. One may wonder, how much First World Scientists are influenced by the concerns and needs of developing countries!  Concluding this point we can state that the events treated under this heading fostered, increased and institutionalized traditional tensions created new potential for conflict by superimposing an alien and alienating system of production and education upon other socio-cultural and economical systems, destroying traditional socio-cultural structures and uprooting thousands of people by the extraordinary size of problems created by human mismanagement should justify extraordinary attention and concern .  So far I dealt only with problems originating from the superimposition of a foreign economic and educational system upon another culture. But there are problems also inherent in the recently victorious and presently predominant global socio-cultural and economical system, *we* have now to talk about as pull factors to forced migration.  **PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE WESTERN SOCIO-ECONOMICAL MODEL**  Just some indications of that which makes us feel justified in our talking of problems inherent in the western socio-economic model the emergence of structural unemployment in the developed countries themselves, i.e. the emergence of a large class of people which does not succeed to re-enter the process of employment and production. This emergence is more and more supported by the open talk of the emerging 'Two Thirds Society", i.e. two thirds of the society can cope with the pace and challenges of the post-modern industrial age and one third can't, whose fate then is to be condemned to live from social welfare, paid for by the rich. The unequal distribution of work and income in western 'Two Third Societies' is reflected, due to international trade and financial transactions and relations, in a more extreme way in the world’s increasing distance between rich and poor countries: The gap in national income between rich and poor countries is doubled since 1960 up-to-date 20% of the world’s richest population possesses 82, 7% of the world’s income, 20% of the world’s poorest countries possess a mere 1, 4%. This is likely to get worse since the rich countries are interested in keeping their standard of production and employment at all costs, mostly to the disadvantage of the poorest. For example: One frequently used method to do this are credits with all its implications and consequences. Poor countries need money and credits to keep their economies going and people fed. Money is available from the rich oil producing countries which favour Muslim 'brother nations', but mostly from western national governmental and financial as well as intergovernmental bodies such as the IMF and World Bank.  **a.** Those bodies often link conditions to their credits, for example, they ask for concession in rights to dig for natural resources which then can be stored and used to control the price for those resources on the world market  **b**. Or they impose demands on agricultural production of LDC’s which forces those countries sometimes to produce something which is beyond their own needs. Criteria for those demands are its value in generating hard currency when being sold on the world market (if this is possible, given the protectionist barriers by the DC's with which they try to protect their domestic farming industries) which in turn can be used to repay debts.  **c.** Another frequent condition is to buy technology and machinery in those countries who give these credits. Referring back and in addition to what I said above on occasion of the construction of barriers, one could argue that those methods are unsuited since they do not satisfy existing needs in a given area. Rather, this kind of transfer creates new and artificial needs which then could be satisfied". However, even this very often does not work as we have seen -again- at the example of the barriers and other oversized developmental projects.  **d.** What is urgently needed, in LDC's is not mass-production, but production of the masses '". This is not easy to implement for their governments. Since LDC's are bound to repay debts, they are forced to build up export orientated, profitable industries whose products sell well on the world market in order to generate hard currency. That it would be 'unprofitable' to employ many workmen which then would be in need of wages, is obvious. Thus, as far as the global economical- financial situation is concerned, one may fear that in spite of all kinds of crises management [Baker and Brady plans], the debt-crises, i.e. impending bankruptcy of many among the poorer states, could not yet be resolved in a permanent and satisfactorily manner.  Last not least the recognition gains ground that the indirect consequence of the present conduct of western lifestyle is incompatible with the ecological balance. Clearer and clearer recognizable are the conjunction of economical production and consumption, the accompanying pollution and consequently the deterioration of the world-climate. This shall be the point where some figures are appropriate to illustrate the extent already present of forced mass migratory movements worldw*ide.* We can see that the relatively small group of political refugees and displaced persons [US Committee for Refugees] is out-weight by the huge number of ' ecological refugees'  First of all, what can we understand by the term ecological refugee? An ecological refugee is someone who is forced to leave his original or habitual place of residence for 4 reasons:  **a,** due to natural causes [flood, famine, volcanoes]  **b**, direct human intervention [barriers, Aral Lake, Cernobyl Bhopal]  **c,** Ecological warfare, which refers more narrowly to acts of consciously committed criminal acts such as the pollution of the Gulf by Iraq in the Gulf War or the destruction of Forests by the Americans during the Vietnam War; this term can be more widely understood as any act of quarrelling factions to systematically destroy the living conditions of their ' enemy' i.e. any policy of the ' burnt soil',  **d**. indirect human intervention into the ecological system e.g. due to global warming, the expansion of the desert etc. I t is possible, of course, that reasons falling under ' d ' in turn are responsible f o r occurrences under heading ‘a’ as the more and more violent hurricanes and storms suggest.  **CONFLICTS FOR THE CONTROL AND USE OF RESOURCES**  Conflicts for the control and use of resources will increasingly determine the political events both domestically and internationally: For example, nationally inside the PC's social unrest will grow between the newly created underclass and all those they think will threaten them in their anyway deplorable situation. A good example here are the growing xenophobic activities in Europe. I agree, however, with P. Winter who argues that " the myth that victims elsewhere in the world are somehow in competition with victims at home is taking root more broadly when the truth is that both sets of victims get the crumbs of available resources, "1" Nationally inside the LDC's : Due to the urbanization and the lack of sufficient occupational facilities, an increasing explosive situation will result either in domestic strife between ' haves' and 'have nots' or induce governments to seek for a distraction from domestic hardships by attacking and external enemy i.e. war.  International conflicts between DC's and LDC's for the control of resources: The dependency of western industry for the import for raw materials is well known. In the wake of increasing competition and scarceness of resources the struggle for their control will intensify. Here we have a third aspect accounting for the outcome of the Gulf War: The West could not afford such large oil reserves to remain within the control of anti-western dictator of Saddam Hussein's calibre. It is common agreement that the control of Oil reserves was the main impetus which created the Great Alliance. In its wake, this violent conflict for the control of resources alone produced temporarily 6 000 000 refugees: From the invasion of Kuwait to the insurrection and actions of Kurds in Northern and Shiits in Southern Iraq to the forcible expulsion of thousands of guest workers from Kuwait in an act of revenge for alleged collaboration with Saddam'. And as the authors of the report 'Die Globale Revolution' argue, this war probably was just the foreshadowing of many conflicts ahead of us. It is also likely that tension will grow between DC 's and LDC ' s at another level: We stated already the imbalance in the distribution of wealth and poverty. We are also aware of the enormous problems inherent in any attempt to provide food and work for the LDC's. Clearly, enormous efforts will be needed to just stop the present deterioration of things, let alone the restoration of that which Opitzcalls "binding force" of the places of original and habitual residence towards those who had to escape ecological disaster and poverty.  Fatally enough, as lack of employment opportunities can directly trigger migration. Indeed, the Commission has recognized that Europe development aid targeted at job creation can help reduce the pressures which directly trigger migration. Many specialists have argued that this form of development aid will not have a significant impact in the absence of broader macro-economic changes.  **CONCLUSION**  As we have seen, the migratory movements are as old as human history. Accordingly, many root causes also of present day migratory movements are not the direct result of the present socio-economical global order. It cannot be denied, however, that size and dimension of presend forced mass migratory movements are influenced and determined by the present world order. We can therefore say with K - H. Merks that migrants are not a disturbance of the present global societal order, but themselves expression of a disturbed global societal order'. Similar conclusion is taken by L. Kuehnhardt. He, too, argues that every forced migratory movement is an aspect of and within the responsibility of the present political world order. They mirror essentially facts of our times and reveal the disintegration of the present ' social contract'. Most pessimistic, however, the present situation is perceived by the authors of the report "Globale Revolution". The concluding remark of the previous author applies both to his article and to Hoffmann Novotny's analysis: "Events take their course, and this course is determined by the force of ideas in the sense of independent forces which interfere from outside with events and direct their course- to a lesser degree than both their producer and consumer tend to believe. However, nobody would deny their suitability for those who have nothing left to loose!  **Work cited:**  *Faist, Thomas (2000),* The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).  *Fischer, Peter A., Reiner Martin and Thomas Straubhaar 1997.* “Interdependencies between Development and Migration “, in Tomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tomas and Thomas Faist, eds., International Migration, Immobility and Development (Oxford: Berg), pp. 91-132.  *Hammar, Tomas, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tomas and Thomas Faist, eds. 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(1996),* “Elements for a More Effective EU Response to Situations of Mass Influx”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 8:1/2, pp. 156-68.  *sBoswell (2002),* “EU Policies to Prevent the Causes of Migration and Refugee Flows: An Integrated Approach?”, forthcoming, Migration-Société, Autumn 2002 (12 pp.). *Castles, Stephen and Sean Loughna (2002),* “Forced Migration, Conflict and Development: Patterns of Mobility to the European Union, Causes and Policy Options”, IPPR, May. Conflict Prevention Network (1998), Yearbook (Baden-Baden: Nomos). *Crisp, Jeff (1999),* “UNHCR’s Role in the Prevention of Refugee-Producing Situations”, UNHCR Geneva.  **QUESTION FIVE**  **Explain the causes of voluntary economic migration?**  Despite the fact that migration is almost as old as humanity itself,and obviously helped shape societies throughout the world, few topics are as contentious or as relevant today. Migration is a fact of life for many of those who hail from the world’s poorest countries at least for those lucky enough to survive often dangerous journeys. Meanwhile in many advanced economies, particularly in the United States and the European Union, anti-immigrant fervor is contributing to the rise of populist politicians. The rising number of migrants and increasing focus on migration reflects multiple trends, including the civilian-centered nature of recent conflicts.  The overwhelming failure of developed countries to respond to influxes of migrants and to manage the integration of existing migrant populations has added fuel to the fire in Brussels and Washington alike. However, along with climate change, migration will be a defining issue of our era. Migration is one of the most contentious and relevant issues of our time, as evidenced by the increasing numbers of migrants and displaced persons and by inflammatory political discourse throughout the world. This paper discusses the underlying causes of recent migration flows and “crises,” such as the civilian-centered nature of recent conflicts, persistent underdevelopment, climate change, and political impasse that prevents conflict resolution and adequate management of migration flows. Further, the paper focuses on policy reforms to (i) tackle the root causes of migration and (ii) minimize the costs and maximize the benefits both social and economic associated with migration.  A Historian may define economic migration as the movement of people from one country to another to benefit from greater economic opportunities in the receiving country. For others, migration is the means to escape poverty, gain better opportunities for their children and obtain job security which may be lacking in their home countries. The economic factors cause international migration. Demographic factors such as age, education, marital status, and language impact one's willingness to migrate. Worsening political and environmental conditions abroad and/or improving conditions at home can lead to less migration. Migration is the permanent movement of people from one place to another. Voluntary migration is where the migrant has a choice whether or not to migrate. Nevertheless, most people migrate for economic reasons, Cultural and environmental factors also induce migration, People decide to migrate because of push factors and pull factors. A push factor induces people to move out of their present location, whereas a pull factor induces people to move into a new location. The Causes of forced and voluntary migration. “Migration is the movement of people, involving a change of residence. It can be internal or external [international], and voluntary or forced. It is usually for an extended period more than a year and does not include temporary circulations such as commuting or tourism.  The people migration can be determined by push and pull factors affect migration. Push factors may include conflict, drought, famine, or extreme religious activity. Poor economic activity and lack of job opportunities are also strong push factors for migration. Pull factors are those factors in the destination country that attract the individual or group to leave their home.  Migration of people is constantly happening, but in a stable society it usually happens because a person chooses to do it. Forced migration occurs when people's lives, well-being or freedom is endangered. Migration can also be forced by natural disasters, when people are forced to evacuate an area.  **Types of Migration and Underlying Causes**  International institutions that work on migration issues typically distinguish between two broad categories of migrants, based on each group’s perceived reasons for migrating. “Voluntary” or “economic” migration usually refers to population movements spurred by economic reasons, when people “choose” to migrate in search of better livelihoods. “Forced” migration refers instead to population movements stemming from violent conflict, persecution, or other situations that oblige people to seek refuge elsewhere.Per the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees “1951 Convention” and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees “1967 Protocol”, a “refugee” is a forced migrant “who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”Internally displaced persons (IDPs) constitute a third and important category, referring to people who have not crossed international borders but were nonetheless forced to leave their place of origin due to conflict, environmental degradation, extreme poverty, etc.  The complex reasons that lead people to migrate often make it difficult to draw a clear distinction between voluntary and forced migration, which in turn makes it difficult to identify and provide adequate protection to refugees as required by international law. The term “mixed migration” denotes migration flows that include both “forced” and “voluntary” migration.  Migration that takes place within legal channels often indicative of voluntary migration, except in the case of some asylum-seekers is referred to throughout this paper as “orderly migration,” per the terminology used by the International Organization for Migration. Some examples of this include students pursuing degrees in other countries and skilled workers granted work authorization.  As implied by the preceding discussion, however, the main cause of voluntary migration is underdevelopment and lack of economic opportunity in many countries, which often leads to migration via unauthorized and sometimes dangerous channels. Such international movements, which take place outside the established legal frameworks for migration, are instead referred to as “irregular migration” and are the primary focus of the forthcoming discussion.  In short to medium term, two primary factors will impact migration. The first is the outcome of current conflicts, particularly whether parties can find a political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Migration policy changes in key migrant destinations will be the other shaping force. Both factors will have long-term consequences. Nonetheless, political solutions to current conflicts could lead to decreases in the number of people attempting dangerous border crossings. Additionally, migration policy reforms to speed up asylum applications or increase legal avenues for migration could have imminent consequences for millions of people currently inhabiting refugee camps and detention centers. Unfortunately, neither seems likely to occur any time soon due to political impasse, a topic discussed in more depth in subsequent sections.  On the other hand, climate change and economic development will influence future migration trends over the long term. As mentioned above, the impact of climate change is already being felt across Africa and the Middle East, as prolonged droughts, desertification, and more frequent natural disasters are already eroding livelihoods and leading to displacement. This presents a particular challenge, given that the existing international legal framework for protecting refugees was established half a century ago, well before policymakers recognized the imminent threat of climate-induced migration.  Economic development will be the other long-term determinant of future migration trends, given that so many people migrate in search of better economic opportunities. Here statistics offer a slightly more encouraging albeit still cautionary tale. Emerging economies have grown relatively quickly over the last several decades, and certain countries most notably China have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Despite these positive trends however, developing countries still lag far behind advanced economies, and are unlikely to “catch-up” in the near future. Additionally, global migration trends seem particularly influenced by relative levels of income and prosperity meaning that many people will still migrate as long as inequality continues to grow between rich and poor countries, even if incomes are rising in absolute terms. Nonetheless, the extent to which developing countries achieve economic growth and transform such growth into overall wellbeing will help shape future migration trends. Recent recognition of the inescapable link between migration and development by the OECD and other international organizations is a positive sign. Finally, although the social and cultural effects of migration cannot be measured as directly as the economic benefits described above, the interaction of multiple cultures has clearly helped shape modern American culture, particularly in its large and diverse urban centers. In Europe as well, demographic changes due to immigration are redefining traditional ideas of what it means to be European. This presents unique challenges as described below, but can also present unique opportunities for cultural enrichment as discussed in the paper.  **A. Harmful Gender Norms**  Gender stereotypes and are often used to justify violence against women. Cultural norms often dictate that men are aggressive, controlling, and dominant, while women are docile, subservient, and rely on men as providers. These norms can foster a culture of abuse outright, such as [early and forced marriage](https://www.concernusa.org/story/the-blackboard-wins-over-the-wedding-altar/) or [female genital mutilation](https://www.concernusa.org/story/kenya-one-mothers-love-daughters-bravery/), the latter spurred by outdated and harmful notions of female sexuality and virginity. These norms can also cause violence when there are challenged. Ibrahim, was a gentle poetry-loving teacher when he married Khadija and they began a family. But after the Syrian war left him a refugee with no job, a sense of worthlessness, and responsibility for his wife, their seven [7] children and his mother, the gentleness fled and he began to beat his wife.  **b. Drought**  A single [drought](https://www.concernusa.org/story/climate-change-visible-signs-in-the-poorest-countries/) can spell disaster for communities whose lives and livelihoods rely on regular, successful harvests, In a number of African countries where Concern works including Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia droughts have become increasingly severe, leaving millions of citizens without the ability to grow food. They rely on this food to feed themselves, their livestock, and their livelihoods. Drought also leaves families without access to clean water, often leading to them turning to dirty water as their only alternative for bathing, drinking, and growing crops. For families, this can mean going for days without food. They may also resort to using contaminated water.  While drought can cause a family to leave for an area that’s more tillable, that’s not the only solution. In countries like Ethiopia, Concern works to build climate resilience. We’ve helped farmers switch from crops like barley, which aren’t drought-resistant, to harvesting potatoes. These survive on less water, and have led families like Ali Assen’s to dramatically improve their lives, moving from a one-room hut to a two-story home with livestock. “We were eating two meals a day for six months and going hungry for the other half of the year 2016.  **c. Hunger**  Just as empowering women can help eliminate hunger, food scarcity also leads to increased gender-based violence. In Malawi, where a 2013 survey revealed that 61% of women and girls said they had experienced sexual violence and 64% had experienced physical violence, an ongoing food crisis only worsened the situation.  Hunger’s connection to drought and other causes on this list is significant: What people in farming regions don’t consume from their own harvests is sold make a living. War and conflict can also mean a lack of access to markets and fields, or that crops and food supplies are destroyed or stolen. Other causes of hunger around the world add up to the same result: Without any other alternatives, families affected by food shortages are often separated by forced migration, with one parent usually the father seeking work in a city to cover costs. Other families leave as a unit to begin their life in a new country. Communities that raise livestock as their primary assets and source of food in drought-stricken Niger have less pasture and water to keep their animals and sole livelihood alive. In Niger, where farmers like Salifou Ahment would struggle to feed their livestock during the dry season, Concern established an animal feed bank. Salifou and other farmers in his village now have access to food year-round, at a fair and affordable price. This service is available a short walk from Salifou’s home, and means he and his family can remain at home.  **d. Flooding**  In Malawi, one of Concern’s focuses has been on resilience. But sometimes nature is just too strong, as we saw in the wake of Tropical Cyclone Idai earlier this year. During Concern’s assessments of the areas devastated by rains and heavy flooding in one village, our team only saw a few people who had ventured back to check on what was left of their homes. They didn’t want to their families back with them, in case the floods returned.  After Hurricane Matthew made landfall in Haiti in 2016, the storm’s lethal winds and rain left 200,000 homes in its wake of destruction. An estimated 1.5 million citizens and more than 10% of the country were left in need of humanitarian aid and damages clocked in at $1.9 billion. According to a report published in 2017 by Cornell University, events prompted by climate change such as drought and flooding could account for up to 1.4 billion forced migrations by the year 2060. By 2100, the researchers estimate that number would surpass 2 billion. In March 2012, a flash-flood washed away the structure that sheltered 30-year-old Abdullah and his family in northeastern Afghanistan. The family followed the direction of the government to rebuild on a flat area of land about a mile away. Such relocation is a huge imposition for people who already live in extreme poverty. Abdullah’s family was one of 63 whose homes were rebuilt with the help of Concern Worldwide international. We also sponsored projects to control and divert the flow of floodwaters, helping to protect the most vulnerable parts of the region.  **e. Earthquakes**  Almost 60,000 Haitians currently live and work in the United States. Many were driven from their homes due to the devastating effects of two major hurricanes and one earthquake in recent years. In 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake hit the capital city of [Port-au-Prince](https://www.concernusa.org/story/resilience-and-willpower-in-haiti/), leaving 1.5 million Haitians homeless. No natural disaster had ever affected a capital city in such a way. The earthquake created a ripple effect that even paralyzed areas well outside the disaster zone. In 2015, a devastating series of earthquakes hit Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India 7.5-magnitude and Nepal 7.8-magnitude and 7.3-magnitude, respectively. These drove hundreds of thousands of residents from their homes. With Our Return to Neighborhoods program in Port-au-Prince, we relocated more than 5,000 people from post-earthquake camps to safe, secure housing following. The program offers housing options, including repairs and rental subsidies. This enabled people to move back into their homes or into new ones. For internal relocation, we provided education vouchers so that children can go to school near their new homes. We also offered training and cash transfers so that people can set up small businesses.  **f. War & Conflict**  The most common factor for migration around the world is conflict. Most recently, the world’s focus has been on the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, with nearly 75% of the country’s Muslim population fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh in the wake of violence and ethnic cleansing. In 2017, amid the escalation of ongoing tension and violence, the United Nations deemed the plight of the Rohingya the “Fastest growing refugee emergency” in the world. Forced migration has been a norm in the Middle East for most of the 21st Century, according to Oxford University’s Refugee Studies Centre. Syria’s deadly civil war has caused over 11 million instances of forced migration. To-date nearly 6.2 million Syrians are internally displaced, and over 5.6 million Syrians are counted as refugees. The Democratic Republic of Congo has the highest number of displaced people on the continent of Africa, with nearly 6 million people forced from their homes by various conflicts. South Sudan has been continuously plagued by war-induced migration during its short existence.  **G. Economic circumstances**  One of the biggest factors for migration are the economic challenges that may affect individuals in their countries of origin. The UN’s 2018 world Migration Report notes that this is a major driver in West Africa, where temporary and permanent migrant workers commonly relocate from countries like Niger and Mali to Ghana and the Côte d’Ivoire for more opportunities to work and support their families. Niger, for example, has one of the fastest-growing populations in the world by 2050 it is expected to triple compared to 2017 figures. However, the country is unable to keep up with the demand for jobs as more and more Nigeriens become old enough to enter the workforce.  Despite decades of growth in emerging economies, few countries have advanced from low-income to middle or higher income status, and gaps in wealth and overall well-being remain large.In particular, job creation has not kept pace with growing working-age populations in much of the developing world, and wages remain lower than in developed economies despite years of growth. Additionally, fast economic growth in low income countries is actually leading to increased migration, since more people now have the economic means to migrate, and gaps between rich and poor countries remain quite large. The following paragraphs present examples from various regions to illustrate the complex causes behind voluntary migration.  In addition to the economic challenges of migration in a time when developed countries themselves experience financial duress, social costs from migration can be high and can impact both state and human security. The failure to integrate migrant populations into society can lead to increased social frictions and, in the worst of cases, to radicalization among immigrant communities. This is particularly evident in Europe right now, where countries have struggled to identify and to contain terrorist threats stemming from migrant communities. This is less prevalent in the US, which has higher violent crime rates generally and where Caucasians are more likely to commit violent crimes such as mass shootings.  **In conclude**, this paper has largely focused on economic causes of migration that could be undertaken. There is need for better Management of Migration. Conflict, underdevelopment, and climate change will continue to affect us for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, history suggests that people will find ways to move while the underlying causes of migration persist, regardless of efforts to stop it. No wall can be high enough, no border patrol sufficient; as long as there is demand for migration, people will find creative means and routes. It is therefore in everyone’s interest to implement sensible policy solutions to manage migration flows in a way that minimizes the human and economic costs associated and maximizes benefits for both sending and receiving countries.  **Work cited:**  *European Council for Refugees and Exiles and the US Committee for Refugees (2002),* Responding to the Asylum and Access Problem: An Agenda for Comprehensive Engagement in Protracted Refugee Situations, Draft report. *Euro-Med Partnership (2002),* Morocco Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2005.  *Faini and Venturini (1994), “Migration and Growth:* The Experience of Southern Europe”, Council for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper.  *Faist, Thomas (2000),* The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). *Fischer, Peter A., Reiner Martin and Thomas Straubhaar (1997),* “Interdependencies between Development and Migration “, in Tomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tomas and Thomas Faist, eds., International Migration, Immobility and Development (Oxford: Berg), pp. 91-132.  *Hammar, Tomas, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tomas and Thomas Faist, eds. (1997),* International Migration, Immobility and Development (Oxford: Berg). *Hathaway, James C. (1995), New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems:* The Distortion of the Palliative Role of Refugee Protection”, Journal of Refugee Studies 8:3, pp. 288-300.  *Heering, Liesbeth, and Ingrid Esveldt (1994),* “Determinants of Migration: An Inventory of Research”, Workshop on the Root Causes of International Migration, Luxembourg, 14-16 December.  **QUESTION SIX [6]:**  **Explain the liberal theories of international relations**?  The central liberal question about international law and politics is: who governs? Liberals assume that states are embedded in a transnational society comprised of individuals, social groups, and sub-state officials with varying assets, ideals and influence on state policy. The first stage in a liberal explanation of politics is to identify and explain the preferences of relevant social and sub-state actors as a function of a structure of underlying social identities and interests. Among these social and sub-state actors, a universal condition is *globalisation*, understood as transnational interdependence, material or ideational, among social actors. It creates varying incentives for cross-border political regulation and interaction. State policy can facilitate, block, or channel globalisation, thereby benefiting or harming the interests or ideals of particular social actors. The state is a representative institution that aggregates and channels those interests according to their relative weight in society, ability to organise, and influence in political processes. In each state, political organization and institutions represent a different subset of social and sub-state actors, whose desired forms of social, cultural, and economic interdependence define the underlying concerns or preferences across “states of the world” that the state has at stake in international issues. Representative functions of international organizations may have the same effect.  The existence of social demands concerning globalization, translated into state preferences, is a necessary condition to motivate any purposeful foreign policy action. States may seek to shape and regulate interdependence. To the extent this creates externalities, positive or negative, for policy-makers in other states seeking to realize the preferences of their individuals and social groups, such preferences provides the underlying motivation for patterns of interstate conflict and cooperation. Colloquially, what states want shapes what they do.  *Liberal theory highlights three specific sources of variation in state preferences and, therefore, state behavior. Each isolates a distinctive source of variation in the societal demands that drive state preferences regarding the regulation of globalization. To avoid simply ascribing policy changes to ad hoc or unexplained preference changes, liberal theory seeks to isolate the causal mechanisms and antecedent conditions under which each functions. In each case, as the relevant domestic and transnational social actors and contexts vary across space, time, and issues, so does the distribution of state preferences and policies.*  ***Ideational liberal***theories attribute state behavior to interdependence among social demands to realize particular forms of public goods provision. These demands are, in turn, based on conceptions of desirable cultural, political, and socioeconomic identity and order, which generally derive from both domestic and transnational socialization processes. Common examples in modern world politics include conceptions of 44 national or civic identity and self-determination, fundamental political ideology such as democratic capitalism, communism, or Islamic fundamentalism, basic views of how to regulate the economy social welfare, public risk, environmental quality, and the balance of individual rights against collective duties. The starting point for an ideational liberal analysis of world politics is the question: How does variation in ideals of desirable public goods provision shape individual and group demands for political regulation of globalization?  **Commercial liberal**theories link state behavior to material interdependence among societal actors with particular assets or ideals. In international political economy, conventional “endogenous policy” theories of trade, finance, and environment posit actors with economic assets or objectives, the value of which depends on the actors’ position in domestic and global markets i.e. patterns of globalization. The starting point for a commercial liberal analysis of world politics is the question: How does variation in the assets and market position of economic actors shape their demands for political regulation of globalization?  **Republican liberal**theories stress the role of variation in political representation. Liberals view all states and, indirectly, international organizations as mechanisms of political representation that privilege the interests of some societal actors over others Sin making state policy. Instruments of representation include formal representation, constitutional structure, informal institutional dynamics, appointment to government, and the organizational capacity of social actors. By changing the “selectorate” the individuals and groups who influence a policy the policy changes as well. The startin**g** point for a republican liberal analysis of world politics is the question: How does variation in the nature of domestic representation alter the selectorate, thus channeling specific social demands for the political regulation of globalization?  Although for analytical clarity we customarily distinguish the three categories of liberal theory, they are generally more powerful when deployed in tandem. Interdependence often has significant implications for both collective goods provision ideational liberalism and the realization of material interests’ commercial liberalism. Moreover, whether underlying preferences are ideational or material, they are generally represented by some institutionalized political process that skews representation republican liberalism. Even the simplest conventional theories of the political economy of international trade, for example, assume that all three strands are important: private economic interest is balanced against collective welfare concerns, whether in the form of a budget constraint or countervailing public policy goals, and these social pressures are transmitted to the state through representative institutions that privilege some voices over others [Grossman and Helpman 1994].  It is important to be clear what liberal theory is not. Theoretical paradigms in international relations are defined by distinctive causal mechanisms that link fundamental causes, such as economic, technological, cultural, social, political, and behavioral changes among states in world politics, to state behavior. Hence the term *liberal* is not used here to designate theories that stress the importance of international institutions; the importance of universal, altruistic, or utopian values, such as human rights or democracy; or the advancement of left-wing or free market political parties or policies. In particular, institutionalist regime theory, pioneered by Robert Keohane and others, often termed “neo-liberal,” is distinctly different. Kenneth Abbott has written that:  EXT Institutionalism analyzes the benefits that international rules, organizations, procedures, and other institutions provide for states in particular situations, viewing these benefits as incentives for institutionalized cooperation relatively modest actions such as producing unbiased information, reducing the transactions costs of interactions, pooling resources, monitoring state behavior, and helping to mediate disputes can help states achieve their goals by overcoming structural barriers to cooperation [2008: 6]. This institutionalist focus on the reduction of informational transaction costs differs from the focus of liberalism, as defined here, on variation in social preferences even if the two can coexist, with the former being a means of achieving the latter. The distinctiveness of liberal theories also does not stem from a unique focus on “domestic politics.” True, liberal theories often accommodate and explain domestic distributional and political conflict better than most alternatives. Yet, it is unclear what a *purely* “domestic” theory of rational state behavior would be, liberal or otherwise. Liberal theories are international in at least three senses. **First,** in the liberal view, social and state preferences are driven by transnational material and ideational globalization, without which liberals believe foreign policy has no consistent purpose.  Second, liberal theories stress the ways in which individuals and groups may influence policy, not just in domestic but in transnational politics. Social actors may engage or be engaged by international legal institutions via domestic institutions, or they may engage them directly. They may organize transnationally to pursue political ends. The liberal assumption that political institutions are conduits for political representation is primarily directed at nation states simply because they are the preeminent political units in the world today; it may also apply to sub-national, transnational, or supranational institutions.  Third, liberal theories like realist, institutionalist, systemic constructivist theories, and any other internationalist account of state behavior are strategic and thus “systemic” in the sense that Kenneth Waltz [1979] employs the term: they explain collective international outcomes on the basis of the interstate distribution of the characteristics or attributes of states, in this case their preferences. The preferences of a single state alone tell us little about its probable strategic behavior with regard to interstate interaction, absent knowledge of the preferences of other relevant states, since liberals agree that state preferences and policies are interdependent and that the strategic games states play matter for policy assumptions shared by all rationalist theories.  The critical quality of liberal theories is that they are “bottom-up” explanations of state behavior that focus on the effect of variations in state society relations on state preferences in a context of globalization and transnational interdependence. In other words, liberalism emphasizes the distribution of one particular attribute socially determined state preferences about the regulation of social interdependence, rather than attributes favored by other major theories e.g, coercive power resources, information, or non-rational standards of appropriate strategic behavior. Indeed, other theories have traditionally defined themselves in contrast to the liberal emphasis on social preferences.  **What Can Liberal Theories Tell Us About International Law Making?**  Liberal theories can serve as the “front-end” for multi-causal syntheses with other theories of institutions, explaining the substance of legal regimes; can generate their own distinctive insights into the strategic and institutional aspects of legal regimes; and can provide explanations for the longer-term dynamic evolution of international law. Let us consider each in turn.  **Liberal Explanations for the Substantive Scope and Depth of International Law**  One way to employ liberal theory is as the first and indispensable step in any analysis of international law, focusing primarily on explaining the substantive content of international interaction. Explaining the substantive focus of law, a task at which few International Relation theories excel, is a particular comparative advantage of liberal theory. Realism and institutionalism seek to explain the outcome of strategic interaction or bargaining over substantive matters, but they take as given the basic preferences, and hence the substance, of any given interaction. Constructivists do seek to explain the substantive content of international cooperation, but do so not as the result of efforts to realize material interests and normative ideals transmitted through representative institutions, but rather as the result of conceptions of appropriate behavior in international affairs or regulatory policy divorced from the instrumental calculations of societal actors empowered by the state. For liberals, the starting point for explaining why an instrumental government would contract into binding international legal norms, and comply with them thereafter, is that it possesses a substantive purpose for doing so. From a liberal perspective, this means that a domestic coalition of social interests that benefits directly and indirectly from particular regulation of social interdependence is more powerfully represented in decision making than the countervailing coalition of losers from cooperation compared to the best unilateral or coalitional alternatives. This is sometimes mislabeled a realist “interest-based” claim, yet most such formulations follow more from patterns of convergent state preferences than from specific patterns of state power [e.g., Abbott 2008]. Thus, liberals have no reason to disagree with Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner’s claim that much important state behavior consistent with customary international law arises from pure coincidence independent calculations of interest or ideals, the use of International law as a coordination mechanism in situations where symmetrical behavior increases payoffs, or the use of International Law to facilitate cooperation where coordinated self-restraint from short-term temptation increases long-term issue-specific payoffs as in repeated bilateral prisoners’ dilemma, where payoffs to defection and discount rates are low [Goldsmith and Posner 1999: 1127]. Contrary to Goldsmith and Posner, however, liberals argue that such cases do not exhaust the potential for analyzing or fostering legalized cooperation. The decisive point is that if social support for and opposition to such regulation varies predictably across time, issues, countries, and constituencies, then a liberal analysis of the societal and sub state origins of such support for and against various forms of regulation is a logical foundation for any explanation of when, where, and how regulation takes place [Keohane 1982; Legro 1997; Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1997; Lake and Powell 1999; Wendt 1999. 48].  The pattern of preferences and bargaining outcomes helps define the underlying “payoffs” or “problem structure” of the “games” states play and, therefore, help define the basic potential for cooperation and conflict. This generates a number of basic predictions, of which a few examples must suffice here. For liberals, levels of transnational interdependence are correlated with the magnitude of interstate action, whether essentially cooperative or conflictual. Without demands from transnationally interdependent social and sub state actors, a rational state would have no reason to engage in world politics at all; it would simply devote its resources to an autarkic and isolated existence. Moreover, voluntary non coercive cooperation, including a sustainable international legal order that generates compliance and evolves dynamically, must be based on common or compatible social purposes.  The notion that some shared social purposes may be essential to establish a viable world order, as John Ruggie observes [1982], does not follow from realist theory even if some realists, such as Henry Kissinger, assumed it [1993. 79]. The greater the potential joint gains and the lower the domestic and transnational distributional concerns, the greater the potential for cooperation. Within states, every coalition generally comprises or opposes individuals and groups with both “direct” and “indirect” interests in a particular policy: direct beneficiaries benefit from domestic policy implementation, whereas indirect beneficiaries benefit from reciprocal policy changes in other states [Trachtman 2010]. Preferences help explain not only the range of national policies in a legal issue, but also the outcome of interstate bargaining, since bargaining is often decisively shaped by asymmetrical interdependencethe relative intensity of state preferences for inside and outside options [Keohane and Nye 1977]. States that desire an outcome more will pay more either in the form of concessions or coercion to achieve it.  More recently, as developed economies have focused more on environmental and other public interest regulation, liberalization has become more complex and conflict-ridden, forcing the GATT/WTO and European Union [EU] systems to develop new policies and legal norms to address the legal complexities of “trade and” issues. In environmental policy, cross-issue variation in legal regulation the far greater success of regulation of ozone depletion than an area such as climate change, for example reflects, most fundamentally, variation in the convergence of underlying economic interests and public policy goals [Keohane and Victor 2011]. The willingness of European Union member states to move further than the more diverse and less interdependent WTO is similarly predictable. The “fragmentation” of the international legal system due to multiple, overlapping legal commitments reflects, from a liberal perspective, underlying functional connections among issues due to interdependence, rather than autonomous tactical or institutional linkage. [Alter and Meunier 2009].  In global financial regulation, regulatory heterogeneity under conditions of globalization especially, in this case, capital mobility undermines the authority and control of national regulators and raises the risk of “races to the bottom” at the expense of individual investors and national or global financial systems [Simmons 2001; Drezner 2007; Singer 2007; Helleiner, Pagliari, and Zimmermann 2010; Brummer 2011]. Major concerns of international legal action include banking regulation, which is threatened when banks, investors, and firms can engage in offshore arbitrage, seeking the lowest level of regulation; regulatory competition, where pressures for lower standards are created by professional, political, and interest 50 group competition to attract capital; and exacerbation of systemic risk by cross-border transmission of domestic financial risks arising from bad loans or investments, uninformed decisions, or assumed risk without adequate capital or collateral. Coordination of international rules and cooperation among regulators can address some of these concerns, but in a world of regulatory heterogeneity, it poses the problem of how to coordinate policy and overcome political opposition from those who are disadvantaged by any standard. High levels of heterogeneity in this issue area, and the broad impact of finance in domestic economies, suggest that legal norms will be difficult to develop and decentralized in enforcement. Similar variation can be observed in human rights. The most important factors influencing the willingness of states to accept and enforce international human rights norms involve domestic state society relations: the preexisting level and legacy of domestic democracy, civil conflict, and such. Even the most optimistic assessments of legalized human rights enforcement concede that international legal commitments generally explain a relatively small shift in aggregate adherence to human rights [Simmons 2009]. By contrast, liberal theories account for much geographical, temporal, and substantive variation in the strength of international human rights norms. The fact that democracies and post-authoritarian states are both more likely to adhere to human rights regimes explains in part why Europe is so far advanced and the constitutional norms and conservative legacy in the United States is an exception that proves the rule. Recent movement toward juridification of the European Convention on Human Rights system, with mandatory individual petition and compulsory jurisdiction, as well as the establishment of a court, occurred in part in response to exogenous shocks the global spread of concern about human rights and the “second” and “third” waves of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s – and in part in order to impose them on new members. Political rights are firmly grounded in binding international law, but socioeconomic and labor rights are far less so a reflection not of the intrinsic philosophical implausibility of the latter, but of large international disparities in wealth and social pressures on governments to defend existing domestic social compromises [Moravcsik 2002, 2004]. Even existing political rights are constrained in the face of economic interests, as when member states ignore indigenous rights in managing large developmental projects.  **Liberal** theories apply also to security areas, such as nuclear nonproliferation. Constructivists maintain that the behavior of emerging nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and Iran is governed by principled normative concerns about fairness and hypocrisy: if existing nuclear states were more willing to accept controls, new nuclear states would be. Realists argue that the application and enforcement of the nonproliferation regime is simply a function of the cost-effective application of coercive sanctions by existing nuclear states; were they not threatened with military retaliation, states would necessarily be engaged in nuclear arms races. Both reasons may be important causes of state behavior under some circumstances. The liberal view, by contrast, hypothesizes that acceptance of non-proliferation obligations will reflect the underlying pattern of material and ideational interests of member states and their societies. In so far as they are concerned about security matters, it reflects particular underlying ideational or material conflicts. Recent research findings on compliance with international nonproliferation norms confirm the importance of such factors. The great majority of signatories in compliance lack any evident underlying desire to produce nuclear weapons. Those that fail to sign face particular exogenous preference conflicts with neighbors or great powers [Hymans 2006; Grotto 2008; Sagan 2011].  **Liberal Explanations for the Institutional Form and Compliance**.  So far, we have considered the implications of liberal IR theory for explaining the substance of cooperation, not its form: when states cooperate legally, but not how they go about it. This may seem appropriate. One might suppose that such a liberal theory is all one needs, for international law is no more than a simple coordination mechanism that ratifies what states would do anyway. This sort of explanation is often mislabeled “realist,” but it is more often a crude version of liberal theory, since, in most accounts, it is a convergence of social preferences, not interstate centralization of coercive power that explains most of the variation in underlying state interests. This may sometimes be enough. Yet in some cases international law surely plays a more independent role. For such cases, liberal theories almost always must still be properly employed as a “first stage,” explaining the distribution of underlying preferences. After that, analysts may hand off to other realist or institutionalist theories to explain choice of specific legal forms, compliance pull, and long-term endogenous evolution. One cannot theorize the efficient matching of means to ends without first explaining the choice of ends. Indeed, liberal theory may constrain or even supplant the theories that are appropriate to employ in later stages of the multi-causal synthesis, because the nature of underlying preferences is a decisive factor shaping the nature of strategic interaction [Moravcsik 1997, 1998; Lake and Powell 1999]. Realist theories, for example, assume an underlying expected conflict of interest sufficient to motivate costly coercive strategies, whereas institutionalist theories assume underlying positive-sum collective action problems. The role of non-rational theories is more complex. In this view to extend Stephen Krasner’s celebrated metaphor once liberalism defines the shape of the Pareto frontier, realism explains distributional outcomes, and institutionalism explains efforts to maximize efficiency and compliance (1991).  This role of liberal theory as the primary stage of multi-causal explanation is an important and increasingly widely recognized one. Yet, to limit the scope of liberal international theories solely to a “first-stage” explanation for initial preference formation and the substance of legal norms would be to ignore many of the fundamental contributions that liberal theory has made, or can potentially make, to the study of the institutionalization, enforcement, and evolution of international law. There are three specific ways in which involvement of social actors can have a direct influence on institutional form and compliance pull. First, the future preferences of individuals and groups have influence decisions about institutionalization and compliance; second, many international legal rules directly regulate the behavior of non-state actors; and third, many international enforcement systems are “vertical,” functioning primarily by embedding international norms in domestic institutions and politics. Let us consider each in turn.  **Social Preferences Influence Institutional Delegation and Compliance** On a conventional functional understanding, international law influences behavior by pre-committing governments with short time horizons or uncertainty about future social circumstances and preferences. States maintain international legal regimes to enhance their capacity for elaborating and enforcing regime norms by enhancing reciprocity, reputation, and retaliation. Yet, from a liberal perspective, cooperation is also what Keohane and Nye [1977] term “complex interdependence” and Robert Putnam [1988] calls a “two-level game,” in which national leaders bargain not just with foreign counterparts, but also with domestic social actors at home and abroad. Legal institutions are, in essence, efforts to establish current arrangements that will appropriately shape not just future interstate interaction, but also future domestic and transnational state–society relations. Future state-society relations are to some degree inherently uncertain, due to exogenous trends and shocks or endogenous feedback induced by commitment to international law. Were this not the case, governments would not need to establish international regimes or overarching norms, such as “legality,” but could simply enter into specific narrow substantive agreements on whatever subject is of importance to them. It is uncertainty that generates much of the demand for transaction-cost–reducing international regimes.  **Conclusion**  To analyze or evaluate such processes precisely, we must depart from the horizontal state-to-state politics and incorporate information about the current and future demands of social groups and the nature of representative institutions. Variation in present and future social preferences the direction, intensity, risk and uncertainty, and time horizon of social demands can have a direct impact on institutional design and compliance. Smart policy makers will design institutions so as to shift and channel social preferences in the future in a direction consistent with their favored view of elaboration of and compliance with the legal regime.  **Work cited:**  *Moravcsik, Andrew (1994).* “Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Institutions,” Working Paper No. 52 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for European Studies). 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Victor (2011).* “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 7–23.  **QUESTION SEVEN [7]**  **How does the international law directly regulate social actors in international relations in situations of forced migration?**  **International Law Directly Regulates Social Actors**  A second way in which variation in social preferences helps explain institutional choice and compliance is that international law and organizations may regulate or involve social or “non-state” actors directly. Many international legal rules and procedures are not primarily designed to shape state policy and compliance, as in the classic model of public international law or conventional WTO dispute resolution, but to assist states in regulating domestic and transnational social actors [Alter 2008]. When states cooperate to manage matters such as transnational contract arbitration, money laundering, private aircraft, multinational firms, emissions trading, or the behavior of international officials, for example, or when they assist refugees; establish institutions within failed states; or combat terrorism, criminality, or piracy; recognize nationalist movements; or grant rights of participation or representation to private actors in international deliberations, they directly influence domestic and transnational non-state actors such as corporations, nongovernmental organizations, private individuals, political movements, international organizations, and criminal and terrorist organizations.  The legal enforcement of many such regulatory regimes functions by empowering individuals and groups to trigger international legal proceedings vis-à-vis states. As we shall see, the greater the range of private access to an international regime, all other things being equal, the more likely it is to be effective and dynamic. Many, perhaps most, international legal instruments are not “self-binding” for states at all, but are instead “other-binding”. They do not force the signatory states to delegate direct sovereignty over government decisions, but are designed primarily to constrain non-state actors. Some regulate international organizations, establishing international procedures or regulating the actions of international officials. Many other international legal rules oversee the behavior of private actors. Much private international law governs corporate activity, individual transactions, investment, communications, and other transnational activities, mostly economic, by non-state actors. Which non-state actors are regulated and how they are regulated by international law is itself determined by the interests and political strength of those and other social groups. [e.g., Keohane and Victor 2011].  **Vertical Enforcement of International Law on the Domestic Plane**  A third way in which social preferences help explain institutional choice and compliance issues relating to international law is that compliance with many international legal norms does not rely on “horizontal” interstate reciprocity and retaliation, but instead on “vertical” enforcement embedded in domestic politics “internalization”. Many, perhaps most, international legal regimes are enforced vertically rather than horizontally. A traditional “horizontal” perspective treats international legal obligations as external institutional constraints on state sovereignty, enforced by interstate retaliation, mediated by via reciprocity, reputation, or linkage [Posner and Yoo 2005]. The horizontal path envisages a role for institutions to render threats to manipulate interdependence more transaction-cost efficient. Institutions may establish norms for granting or revoking reciprocal policy concessions, including or excluding countries in a club, or responding in a linked issue area. The “vertical” path to compliance foresees compliance and enforcement without retaliation. Instead, it seeks to alter the preferences and relative influence of social or non-state actors who favor and oppose compliance, locking in international norms domestically or transnationally by establishing new legal institutions, shifting coalitions, and creating new ideas of public legitimacy [Burley and Mattli 1993; Chayes and Chayes 1993, Moravcsik 1998; Dai 2005; Alter 2008; Simmons 2009]. Many analyses assume that, in issues such as trade, where reciprocal concessions are exchanged at the bargaining stage, enforcement also rests on such mechanisms.  The first and simplest mechanism of vertical enforcement, in accordance with republican liberal theory, some change domestic and transnational representative institutions. Many international obligations are incorporated as constitutional amendment, domestic legislation, treaty law, or through bureaucratic bodies, rules, and procedures. Finally, involvement in legal institutions may link issues domestically, empowering counter-coalitions at home against those who would violate international norms, as occurs within trade policy. Another republican liberal mechanism of vertical institutional enforcement works through the adoption and implementation of soft-law norms by national regulators often working in networks, a characteristic Slaughter associates with “the new world order” [Slaughter 2004]. This is particularly true in human rights areas, where common law courts have become the agents of incorporating international norms a process Melissa Waters calls “creeping monism” 2007. Domestic courts have become mediators of transnational norms on issues such as the death penalty, human rights, and a range of free speech issues, including hate speech, defamation, and Internet activity [Waters 2005].  A second mechanism of vertical enforcement, this time in accordance with commercial liberalism, is to transform the interests of domestic and transnational social groups. From a liberal perspective, the purpose of international cooperation is rarely simply to fix a particular static interstate bargain, but to engineer beneficial and enduring transformation of the domestic and transnational economy, society, and politics. If new policies were not “locked in” in this way by fundamental social, institutional, and cultural change, governments would still be fighting and refighting the same battles over international cooperation with the same supporters and opponents, decade in and decade out. Issues would never be resolved, except by exogenous social, economic, or cultural change. Inducing endogenous shifts in preferences “internalization” of norms is thus not simply a side-effect of cooperation essential to enforcement and compliance; it is often, although not always, the objective [Abbott 2008]. To the extent that domestic economic groups reorient their behavior around these norms, making investments in economic activity predicated on their continued validity, the norms are internalized. When a state implements a trade liberalization agreement, for example, the resulting import competition eliminates some domestic firms that opposed liberalization, causes others to adjust in ways that reduce their demand for protection, and expands or creates exporting firms that benefit from free trade. Another example is the issue of nonproliferation. Governments that promote uniform enforcement of nonproliferation norms tend to have minimal exogenous preference conflicts with neighbors or great powers, whereas those that oppose them tend to have important conflicts. Although they are unlikely to eschew nuclear weapons, studies show that democracies are less likely to cheat on nonproliferation treaty [NPT] commitments; we do not know whether this is because they are more constrained in what they select, more cautious about hypocrisy, or more vulnerable to whistleblowers [Sagan 2011: 239–40]. Much research suggests, however, that genuine compliance requires deeper “NPT-plus” obligations. Understanding whether governments are likely to comply with such norms requires an analysis of economic interests, local security conflicts, global market connections of the civilian nuclear power industry, and leadership structure of states, which can inhibit them from accepting the onerous obligations of committing to goals such as the prevention of smuggling, restrictions on domestic fuel cycle activities, the proper management of spent-fuel resources, the implementation of container shipping protocols, and such [Grotto 2008: 17–18, 23–24].  A third mechanism of vertical enforcement, this time in keeping with ideational liberalism, is to encourage enforcement by embedding new collective objectives in the minds of domestic and transnational actors. International organizations can render ideas more salient in the minds of groups able to transmit and publicize favorable international norms. Commonly cited examples include the impact of national human rights commissions, human rights units in foreign ministries, independent financial institutions, and scientific establishments on the substantive preferences of domestic and transnational actors [P. Haas 1989; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Dai 2005]. Liberals believe this is most likely to occur when such domestic groups are inclined, or can be socialized, to sympathize with the values and interests underlying international norms or can benefit professionally or in other ways from such values. International legal regimes may also affect opportunities and incentives for social actors to organize, mobilize, and represent their views domestically and transnationally.  **Exogenous and Endogenous Evolution of International Law**  A particular advantage of the liberal accounts of the substance, form, and enforcement of international law is that they can be extended to particularly detailed and plausible accounts of the long-term evolution of international legal norms. International law can evolve through liberal mechanisms of either exogenous or endogenous change. Exogenous change takes place when autonomous changes in underlying ideational, commercial, and republican factors drive the elaboration, expansion, and deepening of international legal norms over time. Since exogenous trends in core liberal factors such as industrialization, competitiveness, democratization, globalization, and public ideologies often continue for decades and centuries, and vary widely geographically and functionally, such theories can support explanations for “big-picture” regularities in the scope and evolution of international law over the long term, among countries and across issues [Milner and Keohane 1996; Kahler 1999]. This offers a particularly powerful means of explaining trends in substantive content. For example, nineteenth- and twentieth-century waves of democracy and industrialization have driven a steady shift away from treaties governing military, territorial, and diplomatic practice to treaties governing economic affairs, which now dominate international law making and the activity of international tribunals, and in recent years toward human rights and human security. Endogenous evolution occurs when initial international legal commitments trigger feedback, in the form of a shift in domestic and transnational state society relations that alters support for the legal norms.  Exogenous and endogenous effects are often found together. There is, for example, broad agreement that exogenous shifts in technology, underlying market position, and a desire to expand permanently the size, wealth, and efficiency of the tradable sector of the economy explains the general direction of postwar changes in trade policies. Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997 argue that post-war, multilateral trade liberalization generated domestic economic liberalization, thereby increasing the underlying social support for further rounds of trade liberalization in a continuing virtuous circle of deepening international obligations.  **International Tribunals: Liberal Analysis and Its Critics**  Institutional conditions for successful enforcement and endogenous feedback have been most intensively analyzed in studies of international tribunals. As we have just seen, Slaughter helped pioneer the analysis of “supranational adjudication” in the EU, arguing that the key is not simply international enforcement but the internationalization of norms in domestic legal systems: litigants bring cases to domestic courts, which interact with international tribunals, and international norms feed back into domestic legal systems [Burley and Mattli 1993]. The European experience, according to Slaughter and Helfer, EXT challenges us to transcend the traditional framework of “state versus tribunal,” summoning an image of a confrontation between two discrete entities in which the outcome depends upon whether the state defines its unitary national interest to include compliance with international law. The ECJ and the ECHR have succeeded in becoming effective supranational tribunals by looking not to states per se but to their component institutions, using the link to private parties granted them as supranational tribunals to penetrate the surface of the state [with decisions being made by] courts, ministries, and legislative committees competing and cooperating with one another as part of the normal domestic political process. [1997: 337] Helfer and Slaughter, and many other scholars since, have generalized this approach to other international tribunals, seeking to specify conditions under which they are effective. The process of externalizing and internalizing norms can be analyzed in three stages of a transnational legal process: access, adjudication, and implementation [Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000].  **Access.**  The most critical dynamic in vertical enforcement is not one state bringing pressure to bear on another, but private parties bringing pressure to bear on national 66 governments. This requires institutional mechanisms whereby individuals and social groups can influence the agenda of international tribunals. These include individual petition, referral of cases by domestic courts, and, in criminal cases, independent prosecution. The key is that they be independent of the policy makers against whom pressure is brought to bear. If this is correct, we should expect to observe the following: The lower the cost of access for individuals and social groups with an incentive to use an international tribunal, the more dynamic potential the system has. This is confirmed by the striking empirical correlation between breadth of individual access and the use, effectiveness, and dynamism of international legal arrangements. In the human rights area, similarly, underlying trends, such as democratization and the growth of civil society, are the most important determinants of human rights performance, but international legal institutions can have a secondary impact. This impact is dependent on access in the form of individual petition and, in criminal systems, private prosecution. Human rights arrangements without these institutional forms are far less dynamic.  **Adjudication**  For legalization, access is necessary but insufficient. International and domestic tribunals must also have incentives to adjudicate cases in a way consistent with the enforcement, internalization, and deepening of international norms. Without “autonomous domestic institutions committed to the rule of law and responsive to citizen interests,” international norms are unlikely to be internalized. Although the receptivity of domestic courts to international jurisprudence may depend in part on a common cultural commitment to legal process per se, it depends more on the institutional independence of domestic actors and common substantive values, such as “individual rights and liberties in systems where the individuals themselves are ultimately sovereign” [Helfer and Slaughter 1997: 334]. In systems where judges are not independent, or where the divergence between the domestic and international normative systems at stake in individual rulings is too high, domestic judges will not have incentive to make common cause with a supranational tribunal against the government. This requires that courts be relatively autonomous. If this is correct, we should observe that where the domestic polity has elements of a rule-of-law system, granting autonomy to judges and legal adjudicators, and where judges possess sympathetic values, international legal systems will tend to function better. It also helps if international or domestic adjudicators are competent, autonomous, and neutral, and they possess a manageable caseload, fact-finding capacity, high quality of legal reasoning, and an ability to engage in judicial networking [Helfer and Slaughter 1997]. Liberals hypothesize that the density of “vertical” international legal commitments and overall legal cooperation tends to be highest among advanced industrial democracies.  **Implementation**  Helfer and Slaughter argue that “the overall boundaries for [courts] are set by the political institutions of [regimes], above all the member states.” If courts become too “teleological,” that is, if they adopt a mode of interpretation biased toward achieving further legal integration “too far too fast,” the member states may not comply, or might even act “to curtail its jurisdiction or urge their national courts to disregard its judgments,” or to “shift the composition of the Court” [Helfer and Slaughter 1997: 314–18]. This principle can be formulated as follows: national governments must have interests that incentivize them to implement the judgments of domestic courts, or at least not to defy them outright. The more effective courts are “those charged with policing modest deviations from a generally settled norm or modifying a particular rule or set of rules incrementally” [Helfer and Slaughter 1997: 330] a quality that is linked both to interest-based politics and to preexisting rule-of-law norms. Helfer and Slaughter continue, “the link between liberal democracy and effective supranational adjudication” is “complex and contingent, particularly at the margins” [1997: 334].  Recent studies confirm this close relationship between evolution of legal norms and national institutions and interests concerning compliance. In environmental cooperation, for example, liberal states are more likely than illiberal states to create and maintain structures for regularized monitoring and implementation review that often enhance compliance [Raustiala and Victor 1998]. One study of compliance with European social and legal norms concludes that “the structure of domestic institutions seems to be key in explaining variance in the mechanisms through which compliance occurs” [Checkel 2000: 34]. The domestic political, administrative, and financial cost of compliance is a further constraint on the willingness of states to follow international legal norms. Raustiala and Slaughter [2002: 545] stress that “compliance with the International Whaling Convention, for example, which requires little action by most states, should be higher than compliance with many narcotics agreements, which require pervasive and costly domestic regulation.  **Critics of the Liberal Analysis of Tribunals**  Liberal theorists such as Helfer and Slaughter contend that international legal regimes more deeply internalized in society often generate more effective compliance and more dynamism over time than do conventional state-to-state legal arrangements. The resulting debates have received much scholarly attention, but the underlying critique seems misplaced. As we have seen, liberal theory in fact predicts considerable variation in the effectiveness and dynamism of international law, both among democracies and among autocracies, based on variation in domestic and transnational ideas, interests, and institutions a finding that may coexist with the observation that democracies are, as a whole, more law-abiding. They also accept that the EU and the ECHR exhibit more dynamism than other legal systems, though they seek to exclude Europe from consideration as an exceptional “political union”.  To present this fact as a critique creates disagreement where none exists. Helfer and Slaughter do maintain that democratic states are more likely to establish dynamic and successful vertical “supranational” adjudication systems, yet, as we have seen, they do not view this relationship as dichotomous: “Non-democracies may have democratic impulses, embodied in specific institutions; For example, international economic law can be developed with a nondemocratic China, while even the most advanced democracies, such as the United States in human rights, have incentives to resist compliance with international norms, which is why courts always need be jurisprudentially incremental and politically cautious [Helfer and Slaughter 1997: 314–17].  **Liberalism as Normative Theory: Sovereignty and Democracy**  Liberal theories of international law also have implications for the conceptual analysis and normative evaluation of international law. Liberalism can help shape our understanding of specific legal concepts, even those that govern traditional interstate relations. An example is the concept of national sovereignty and related notions of “intervention,” “domestic jurisdiction,” and “legitimacy.” For liberals, sovereignty, like the state itself, is socially embedded and constructed. Its meaning is thus fluid. Without rejecting entirely the institutionalist view that sovereignty is a transaction-cost reducing means to simplify interstate interaction, the realist view that prevailing conceptions of sovereignty may result from coercion, or the constructivist insight that the sovereignty norm may gain strength from its legal form or habitual acceptance over time, liberals insist that the substantive meaning of the sovereignty norm varies greatly as a function of the domestic and transnational social context.  Yet, the normative implications of liberal theory go beyond recognition of existing pragmatic policy constraints. This would be to render it conservative and status quo oriented, as some critics’ charge [Mills and Stephens 200]. In fact, liberal theory supports normative evaluation and critique of existing international law. One such area is in problematizing the democratic legitimacy of international law on which there is now a burgeoning scholarly interest.  Liberal theory is centrally concerned with the question of social representation; that is, with whose interests and ideals international law represents. Liberal theory, with its focus on the ways in which international engagement alters domestic processes, suggests that the proper way to pose this question is not to ask whether international institutions themselves are democratic, but whether domestic democratic processes are enhanced or degraded by participation in transnational legal processes [Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009]. To be sure, judging whether a system of social representation is fair and equitable requires a sophisticated set of normative standards from democratic theory to judge them about which different analysts may disagree [Buchanan 2004: 18; Keohane et al. 2009]. It also requires a valid understanding of the empirical functioning of domestic and international systems of representation provided by liberal theory. For example, pluralist, libertarian, deliberative, and social democratic critics may differ in assessing the same pattern of facts [Moravcsik 2004].  Another reason to be relatively sanguine about the effect of international law on domestic democracy is that the proper “applied” standard if we use prevailing domestic practices to judge international commitments would not be the pure majoritarian norm adopted by many critics, but a “constitutional democratic” standard. All modern democratic systems are based on complex systems of domestic constitutional delegation; most acts of international legal delegation are no different in kind and not necessarily any less subject to public control than these [Goldsmith and Levinson 2009; Keohane et al. 2009]. From a liberal perspective, moreover, such interstate exchanges of democratic authority are essential policy-making instruments in an interdependent world, where citizens of one nation, in exchange for committing to limit domestic discretion in areas that affect other nations, secures the pre-commitment of foreign counterparts to adopt particular policies in areas that affect them policies over which they otherwise would have no control.  **Conclusion:**  Even if one concludes that certain international legal practices are democratically legitimate initially upon delegation, it might be objected that legal systems can develop a life of their own that can eventually escape democratic control. Although this may occur in some cases, we have seen based on trade and human rights that endogenous legal processes of this kind generally seem to have a much less significant effect on the evolution of substantive policy making than do exogenous factors. One reason is, as we have seen in liberal analyses of tribunals, is that access, adjudication, and implementation remain closely bound up with domestic politics. This makes it difficult to argue that autonomous evolution of legal systems generally traps national publics into entirely unexpected and unwelcome substantive outcomes even if individual cases may sometimes diverge from the norm. This is good news for those who believe that international law rests on a firm basis of consent. The fate of the Euro is putting this proposition to the test. There is much more work to be done in assessing the democratic legitimacy of specific international legal arrangements, and debates must be conducted between those with different normative starting points. It is clear, however, that estimating the impact of specific international legal institutions on domestic democratic practice assessed in terms of popular control, the quality of deliberation, individual and minority rights, and suppression of special interests requires the type of detailed empirical analysis of the real-world behavior of domestic social interests and representative institutions that liberal theory offers.  **Work cited:**  *Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and William Burke-White (2006).* “The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law),” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 327–52.  *Slaughter-Burley, Anne-Marie (1993).* “New Directions in Legal Research on the European Community,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 391–400.Stone Sweet, Alec (2000). Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (New York: Oxford University Press).  *Weiler, J. H. H. 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